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In today’s marketplace, firms’ exposure to business uncertainties and risks are 
continuously increasing as they strive to meet dynamically changing customer needs 
under intensifying competitive pressures. Consequently, modern supply chains are 
continuously evolving to effectively manage these uncertainties and the allied risks 
through both operational and financial hedging strategies. In practice, firms extensively 
use operational hedging strategies such as operational flexibility, capacity flexibility, 
postponement, multi-sourcing, supplier diversification, component commonality, 
substitutability, transshipments and holding excess stocks as operational means for risk 
management. On the other hand, financial hedging which involves buying and selling 
financial instruments, carrying large cash reserves or adopting conservative financial 
policies, changes the cash flow stream of the firms and may help to reduce the firms 
exposure to business risks and uncertainties. Overall, in this dissertation we explore how 
risk management can be integrated with operating decisions so as to improve the firm 
value creating more wealth for the shareholders.   
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In the first essay, we focus on capacity flexibility as a means of operational 
hedging for risk management in an MTO production environment under demand 
uncertainty. We demonstrate that capacity flexibility may not only be used to hedge 
against the demand uncertainty, but may also be employed to effectively protect against 
possible suboptimal operating decisions in the future. In the second essay, we focus on 
operational hedging in financially constrained startup firms when making short-term 
production and long-term investment decisions. We provide an analytical characterization 
of the optimal investment and operating decisions and analyze the impact of market 
parameters on the operations of the firm. Our findings highlight an interesting operational 
hedging behavior between the process investment decisions and the short-term 
production commitments of the firm when they are faced with financial constraints.  
Our third essay focuses on the value of integrated financial risk management 
activities by publicly traded established firms under the risk of incurring financial distress 
cost. Different from the existing operations management literature, we study the risk 
management by a public corporation within the value framework of finance; hence our 
findings do not require any specific assumptions about the investors' utility functions. 
Moreover, we contribute to the operations management research by examining the impact 
of the costs of financial distress on hedging and operating plans of the firm. Overall, in 
this dissertation, we examine the effective integration of operational and financial risk 
management so as to improve the firm value creating more wealth for the shareholders.   
viii
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1Chapter 1 
Executive Summary 
Uncertainty is an integral part of most real world problems in the domain of 
operations management. Today, as the product markets become more and more 
competitive, effective management of risk associated with operational uncertainties 
becomes a critical factor for the economic viability of the firms. Hence, modern supply 
chains are continuously evolving to effectively manage their uncertainties and the allied 
risks through both operational and financial hedging strategies.  
In this dissertation, we adopt the definition of hedging by Van Mieghem (2003): 
“Mitigating risk, or hedging, involves taking counterbalancing actions so that, loosely 
speaking, the future value varies less over the possible states of nature”. In this respect, 
financial hedging refers to trading financial instruments such as options, futures or other 
financial derivatives to counterbalance other actions. On the other hand, operational 
hedging refers to mitigating risk by counterbalancing actions without using financial 
instruments. In practice, as discussed by Van Mieghem (2003) operational hedging may 
take various forms such as process flexibility, operational flexibility, dual-sourcing, 
component commonality, substitutability, transshipments, holding safety stocks and 
having warranty guarantees.  
The second chapter of my dissertation specifically focuses on the value of flexible 
capacity, in an MTO production environment, to hedge against operational risks 
associated with demand uncertainty. Flexible capacity is an essential element of most 
MTO production environments in which it is crucial to quickly respond and satisfy 
2diverse customer demand. Further, given the high capital investment required for flexible 
production equipment, deciding on an adequate level of capacity flexibility is an 
important strategic problem for the firms. 
Motivated by a problem in computer manufacturing, we study a realistic multi-
period capacity management problem where we explicitly distinguish between two types 
of capacity flexibility: (1) operational flexibility and (2) process flexibility. The goal of 
this chapter is to shed light on the connection between the value of flexibility and the 
operating decisions of a firm. We demonstrate that process flexibility may not only be 
used to hedge against demand uncertainty, but may also be employed to protect against 
possible suboptimal operating decisions in the future. In particular, suboptimal myopic 
operating policies, which are common in practice, can be hedged through process 
flexibility decisions prior to the beginning of the sales season. In addition, we show that 
the value of process flexibility depends on the operating policies as well as the length of 
the planning horizon. Specifically, the value of process flexibility increases with the 
length of the planning horizon, under optimal operating policies. However, this result is 
reversed if a myopic operating policy is adopted.  
In the third chapter, we examine the operational hedging strategies for a 
financially constrained startup firm when making short-term production and long-term 
process investment decisions. Unlike their established counterparts, startup firms are 
more subject to uncertainties in firm and market characteristics, as well as in their return 
on investments. Further, startups are more restricted by debt and other financial 
considerations. Hence, they should allocate their limited amount of cash funds between 
operations and R&D very cautiously to avoid bankruptcy during the early phases of 
development. While short-term production is necessary to maintain the firm’s cash flows 
and to keep up with the cash outflows, long-term investment is vital for the survival of 
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the firm in the future. Therefore, whether to focus on short-term production to maximize 
immediate profits instead of investing in R&D is a dilemma faced by many startups early 
in their lifecycle.  
We study this dilemma by examining the production quantity and cost-reducing 
R&D investment decisions in a competitive market, using a two period model. This 
research highlights an interesting operational hedging behavior between the process 
investment decisions and the short-term production commitments of the firm. That is, a 
change in the investment policy of the firm is always accompanied by a counter-action in 
the production decisions. We show that aggressive (conservative) investment plans are 
hedged through aggressive (conservative) production decisions.   
The fourth chapter of my dissertation explores the joint financial hedging and 
operating decisions of a shareholder-value maximizing firms in commodity markets. 
Although our research is motivated by the flour milling industry, our findings can be 
easily generalized to other commodity processor firms which are exposed to fluctuations 
in commodity prices. As it is well known in the finance literature, in the absence of 
frictions, engaging in financial hedging is a neutral proposition. That is, it should not 
affect the optimal production plan, and it does not create value for firm's shareholders. 
However, when the firm faces capital market frictions, such as financial distress costs, 
bankruptcy costs, taxes and agency issues, financial hedging can contribute to 
shareholder-wealth creation.  
We illustrate how financial hedging can be utilized to enhance firm value under 
the risk of incurring costly financial distress which is a common form of capital market 
imperfection. The risk of incurring costly financial distress changes the optimal operating 
decisions of the firm, and induces more conservative production decisions with respect to 
the first-best production levels. We first quantify this under-production problem, and then 
4illustrate how financial futures can be used to mitigate it and generate more wealth for the 
shareholders. In particular, we show that a coordinated financial hedging and operating 
plan contributes to shareholder-wealth creation, (1) by reducing the firm's exposure to 
financial distress risk and mitigating the corresponding costs, and (2) by enabling the firm 
to operate at a higher level of output.  
This research contributes to the existing operations management literature in two 
ways. First, we study the risk management decisions of a public corporation within the 
value framework of finance; hence our findings do not require any specific assumptions 
about the investors' utility functions. Second, we explore the impact of the costs of 
financial distress on hedging and operating plans 
Overall, in this dissertation we examine the value of integrated risk and operations 
management decisions by firms under different economic and financial conditions. In 
Chapter 5, we summarize our results together with important managerial implications and 
point to directions for future research. 
5Chapter 2 
Managing Capacity Flexibility in Make-to-Order Production 
Environments 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
As the competition in high-tech markets becomes more and more intense, product 
differentiation and customization becomes a top priority for many companies. For 
instance, today, most of the companies in the computer manufacturing industry allow 
their customers to customize nearly every component of their products. While product 
customization is a must for strategic competition in these markets, increased levels of 
customization also come with their own operational-level challenges. 
This chapter studies such an operational challenge recently faced by a high-tech 
make-to-order manufacturing firm: managing multiple flexible production lines to 
produce multiple product families so as to minimize the total operating cost (including 
the cost of managing process flexibility and the backlogged demand), over multiple 
production periods where the demand for the products is highly uncertain. The firm 
which motivated this research is a manufacturer of electronic devices that consist of a 
single chassis and a set of parts assembled on it. Products are grouped into families 
depending on the chassis that they are built onto and each family requires a different set 
of parts. While this work was motivated by a firm in the electronics industry, many of the 
same issues studied here are also faced by make-to-order manufacturing firms in other 
industries. 
On the demand side, customers are allowed to choose almost every part of their 
products. In particular, a customer order includes a selection of chassis type and a set of 
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parts that are available for that chassis. Therefore, it is possible to start the final assembly 
of a product only after a firm customer order is received. On the supply side, customer 
orders are produced on multiple production lines which may be adjusted to manufacture 
any set of product families prior to the start of production. The adjustments are time 
consuming and costly; hence it is not practical to change them once the production is 
started. The same set of assignments is preserved over multiple production periods, until 
a significant change in the demand pattern is observed (e.g., when a new product is 
launched or a significant price promotion is announced).  
Prior to the start of production, the firm decides a product-to-line assignment 
which we will refer to as the process flexibility of the firm. Process flexibility refers to 
the ability of a firm to produce multiple products on multiple production facilities or 
lines, as described by the process-flexibility literature (see Jordan and Graves 1995). Note 
that each line may produce multiple products and each product may be produced on 
multiple lines. 
As greater process flexibility is adopted by the firm, i.e., as more products are 
assigned to more lines, the firm’s ability to match capacity with demand improves. 
However, process flexibility comes at a cost, in particular, assigning product i to line j 
involves a certain cost depending on i and j due to: (1) pre-positioning the related parts 
and chassis inventory next to the production line, (2) computer programming and setup, 
and (3) dedicating labor and material handling equipment to produce family i on line j 
during the planning horizon. Hence each assignment increases the process flexibility of 
the firm at a certain cost. 
Once the process flexibility decision is made, operating the system by allocating 
capacity to demand is another practical challenge in a multi-period planning horizon. In 
particular, operational flexibility of the firm, i.e., the ability to dynamically change 
7capacity allocations among different product families over time, plays a critical role on 
the selection of capacity allocations. Further, operating decisions also affect the choice of 
process flexibility ex ante. 
Regarding the operational flexibility of the firm two basic modeling approaches 
are considered: (1) a Dynamic Allocation Model (DAM), where the allocation decisions 
are made after observing the demand at the beginning of each production period and (2) a 
Fixed Allocation Model (FAM), where the allocation decisions are made at the beginning 
of the planning horizon together with the assignment decisions and these decisions do not 
change in response to demand realizations from period to period. 
The sequence of decisions for our firm is as follows (see Figure 2.1): First, based 
on the forecasted demand, the firm commits to a process flexibility configuration prior to 
the start of production and incurs a certain flexibility cost. Next, at the beginning of every 
production period t, demand is realized and the production capacity is allocated to meet 
that demand and the existing backlog subject to the process flexibility configuration and 
the operational flexibility of the firm. Unmet demand from period t is backlogged and 
carried to the next production period. The overall objective (under both DAM and FAM) 
is to minimize the total operating cost over the planning horizon, which includes the cost 





Under DAM: Process flexibility 
configuration is decided.  
Under FAM: Process flexibility 
configuration and allocation 
decisions are made.   
Period 3Period 2Period 1 
Planning Horizon 
1~d 2~d 3~d 4
~d Td~
… 
Demand ( td? ) is realized and,  
 (1) under DAM  allocation decisions are revised,  
 (2) under FAM allocation decisions are kept fixed. 
Period T 
Figure 2.1: A Graphical Representation of DAM and FAM 
As the sequence of decisions suggests, we model DAM as a multistage stochastic 
integer program with binary decisions only in the first stage and FAM is modeled as a 
single stage stochastic integer program. We also provide effective procedures to solve our 
mathematical models. Regarding DAM we assume that the product demands during the 
production periods are independent and identically distributed with a known distribution. 
The independence assumption is key in our development but the identically-distributed 
assumption is easily relaxed.  
Note that FAM has no operational flexibility since each line is allocated a fixed 
time to produce a certain family, while DAM has full operational flexibility. Fixing 
allocation decisions may have significant operational benefits including: reduced 
scheduling problems, operational standardization and increased efficiency (Li and 
Tirupati 1997). However, in our setting, quantifying these benefits is not straightforward 
since it is not easy to incorporate them in a mathematical decision model. In practice, our 
firm employs an operating policy that is close to FAM (allocations are rarely changed in 
9response to demand realizations). Therefore in this chapter, FAM will serve as a 
benchmark to evaluate the potential benefits of operational flexibility observed under 
DAM.  
We provide two sets of computational analyses. First, we quantify the potential 
benefits of operational flexibility by comparing the performance of DAM and FAM, in 
the presence of demand uncertainty under optimal process flexibility decisions. We 
demonstrate that operational flexibility is most beneficial when demand is well balanced 
with capacity and the variability of the demand is high. 
Second, we investigate the value of process flexibility in a multi-period 
production framework under different dynamic operating policies. For this purpose we 
introduce the myopic version of DAM as a third operating model (MDAM) where the 
firm may change the allocations at the beginning of each period, but does so without 
taking the impact on future periods into account. By comparing the value of process 
flexibility under DAM and MDAM, we show that process flexibility may not only be 
used to hedge against the demand uncertainty, but may also be employed to protect 
against possible suboptimal operating decisions in the future. In particular, firms adopting 
myopic operating policies need to form denser process flexibility chains prior to the 
beginning of the production. We further investigate the value of process flexibility as the 
length of the planning horizon changes.  
The rest of the chapter is configured as follows: In Section 2.2, we provide a brief 
review of the related literature and outline our contributions. In Section 2.3, FAM is 
explained in detail and a solution algorithm, based on Kelley’s (1960) cutting-plane 
method, is presented. Section 2.4 explains the DAM and presents a sampling-based 
decomposition method to find a near-optimal solution. Section 2.5.1 presents a 
computational study of the benefits of operational flexibility under various circumstances 
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by comparing the performance of FAM and DAM. Section 2.5.2 is dedicated to the 
analysis of the value of process flexibility. We conclude with a brief discussion of results 
and future research directions in Section 2.6. 
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Our flexible assembly line management problem is most closely related to the 
manufacturing-flexibility and production-scheduling literatures. The literature on 
manufacturing flexibility is extensive. Sethi and Sethi (1990) provide a comprehensive 
literature review of manufacturing flexibility starting from the 1920s. More recent 
literature reviews can be found in Zhang et al. (2003) and De Toni and Tonchia (1998). 
Here, our review of the manufacturing-flexibility literature is specifically focused on 
capacity flexibility. 
The capacity flexibility literature is also extensive, but the related literature can be 
categorized in two main groups. The first stream of research focuses on investment in 
plants or equipment that are dedicated versus totally flexible. The second stream of 
research allows for intermediate levels of flexibility, i.e., the capacity may be adjusted to 
any level of flexibility from dedicated- to fully-flexible production. The former stream 
includes Fine and Freund (1990), Van Mieghem (1998), Li and Tirupati (1994, 1995, 
1997) and Netessine et al. (2002). 
Fine and Freund (1990) consider a firm which has the option to invest in both 
product-dedicated capacity and flexible capacity. The latter is able to produce all kinds of 
products, but the firm has to make its investment decision prior to observing the demand. 
They model the problem as a two-stage stochastic program in which the capacity 
investment decisions are made in the first stage and the production decisions are made in 
the second stage. Their objective includes total revenues less operating and capacity 
11
investment costs. They investigate the tradeoff between the cost of investing in flexible 
capacity and the ability to respond to uncertain demand. 
Van Mieghem (1998) shows the impact of price- and cost-mix differentials when 
deciding between investing in flexible and dedicated capacity. Like Fine and Freund 
(1990), he considers a model in which investment decisions are made at the beginning of 
the time horizon. Van Mieghem and Rudi (2002) extend Van Mieghem (1998) to a 
dynamic setting with multiple products, multiple processing and storage points, which is 
called a newsvendor network. 
Li and Tirupati (1994) also address investment in flexible and non-flexible 
technology. In contrast to the previous papers, they consider a multi-period problem with 
deterministic demand over time. The objective is to minimize the total discounted cost, 
which includes the cost of technology investment and the operating cost over the 
planning horizon. Heuristics are provided to generate good investment strategies. Li and 
Tirupati (1995) consider the same problem with two products and stochastic demand. 
However, in this setting unlike Van Mieghem and Fine and Freund, demand uncertainty 
is addressed by specifying a target service level. They argue that the multi-period version 
of the problem is not tractable and provide a solution method for the single-period 
problem. Li and Tirupati (1997) extend their previous two papers by explicitly 
considering two kinds of operating policies, which refer to the allocation of flexible 
capacity among different products arising from: (1) a Static Allocation Model (SAM) and 
(2) a Dynamic Allocation Model (DAM). In SAM, the allocation of flexible capacity to 
product lines is made at the beginning of the planning horizon. In DAM they permit 
dynamic allocations of flexible capacity in each period after demand realizations are 
observed. In both models the objective is to minimize the investment cost subject to 
service level constraints. For SAM, an exact exponential time algorithm is provided to 
12
solve the model. Assuming a proportional allocation rule, the DAM is approximated with 
a single period model and a heuristic is provided to generate good solutions under special 
conditions. 
The literature mentioned above is similar to our work in the sense that the cost 
and benefits of flexibility are considered explicitly. However, they only consider two 
types of capacity: fully flexible and non-flexible capacity. In our case, the capacity (i.e., 
the assembly lines) can be adjusted to any intermediate level of flexibility at a certain 
cost. In addition, except for Li and Tirupati (1994) who model demand as being 
deterministic, the above papers only consider single period models which may not be 
sufficiently realistic for many practical situations as mentioned by Van Mieghem (1998): 
“… our approach may be too highly stylized to serve as a practical decision support 
system, which may need to consider more complex models for which one may need to 
resort to numerical methods …”. With its multi-period structure and stochastic demand 
our models are arguably more realistic for practical purposes. 
The second stream of capacity-flexibility literature, which originates with Jordan 
and Graves (1995), allows for choosing among resources with an intermediate level of 
flexibility. This line of research also includes Graves and Jordan (1991), Graves and 
Tomlin (2003), Garavelli (2003), and Katok et al. (2003).  
Jordan and Graves (1995) specifically focus on process flexibility, which is the 
ability of a firm to manufacture different kinds of products in the same production facility 
at the same time. Several principles of the benefits of process flexibility are developed, 
including: (1) limited flexibility (each plant builds only a few products) can achieve 
almost all the benefits of total flexibility (each plant builds all the products), and (2) 
limited flexibility should be configured to chain products and plants together as much as 
possible. Jordan and Graves (1995) provide analytical support for these principles. A 
13
main focus of their paper is a measure to quantify the benefits of the given product-plant 
configuration, and they use this measure to guide the search for a good limited-flexibility 
configuration. While a configuration which yields almost all the benefits of total 
flexibility is identified, the authors do not explicitly study associated cost trade-offs. We 
explicitly model the cost of process flexibility, and in this case, the flexibility measure of 
Jordan and Graves (1995) cannot be used to guide a search for a good configuration due 
to the combinatorial nature of the problem. Additionally, Jordan and Graves (1995) 
assume that the demand uncertainty is revealed at a single time point, i.e., immediately 
after the flexibility configuration decision. This limitation is recognized by the authors 
who say: “… in practice one must allocate production capacity to the products in real 
time as the demand is realized”. Our model addresses this limitation by considering a 
multi-period model in which the unmet demand is backlogged at the end of each period. 
The results of Jordan and Graves are based on the assumption that the firm 
optimally allocates capacity after the process flexibility decision has been made. We 
reconsider this issue in a multi-period framework and study the manner in which the 
value of process flexibility depends on the operating policies employed. Indeed, we show 
that a myopic operating policy (commonly practiced) may significantly reduce the value 
of a process flexibility configuration and increase the need for more process flexibility. 
We note that Bish et al. (2005) also consider the impact of allocation policies on system 
performance in a single period, two-product, two-firm case under fully flexible and 
dedicated manufacturing settings. 
The work by Graves and Tomlin (2003) extends the chaining ideas of Jordan and 
Graves (1995) to multi-stage supply chains. They show that the effectiveness of a 
flexibility configuration, in multi-stage supply chains, is reduced due to stage-spanning 
bottlenecks and floating bottlenecks, which are not present in single-stage supply chains. 
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In contrast to the above work, Garavelli (2003) considers the logistics aspect of process 
flexibility.  
Further, Gurumurthi and Benjaafar (2004) show the effectiveness of chaining in 
queueing systems under varying parameters and control policies. Worker cross-training 
(similar to process flexibility) and skill chaining are also studied in the queueing 
literature by Hopp et al. (2004) and Iravani et al. (2007). 
Regarding the literature on production scheduling, the papers of Ahmadi et al. 
(1992) and Bollapragada and Rao (1999) are most closely related to our work. Similar to 
our setting, Ahmadi et al. (1992) consider a production facility with parallel production 
lines that are capable of producing all the product families. However, in their work, a 
setup is required to switch the production from one family to another, and this setup 
involves both a changeover cost and changeover time. Assuming a deterministic demand 
over the planning horizon, the authors develop a production schedule for each production 
line, which minimizes the total changeover and waiting cost over the planning horizon. 
Unlike our case, Ahmadi et al. (1992) assume that the changeover operation may only be 
performed at the beginning of a period. Hence, each line is dedicated to a single product 
family for that production period. Therefore, their problem is a multi-line assignment 
problem, where the lines are assigned (dedicated) to product families during a production 
period and a setup is incurred only if the assignment for a line changes between two 
consecutive periods. In our production system, since the number of product families 
exceeds the number of production lines, dedicating production lines to single products is 
not possible. In particular, dedicating a whole production line to a product family with 
relatively low demand will make our system very inefficient. So, in our problem we 
assign families to production lines and partial assignments are allowed, i.e., a family may 
be assigned to multiple lines and a line may be assigned multiple families.  
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Bollapragada and Rao (1999) consider allocating the production of multiple items 
to multiple non-identical lines under constant deterministic demand. First, the item 
demands are assigned to the production lines, as in our case, and partial allocations are 
allowed. After these assignments, in the second stage, optimal batch sizes and production 
schedules are generated for each line to minimize the sum of average production cost, 
setup cost, inventory holding cost and cost of lost sales. The assumption of deterministic 
constant demand over the planning period allows the authors to divide the problem into 
two tractable stages and solve a detailed scheduling problem in the second stage. In our 
problem, such a detailed two-stage analysis is not tractable due to multi-period stochastic 
demand. 
2.3. FIXED ALLOCATION MODEL 
In this section, we develop and analyze the fixed allocation model (FAM), which 
closely reflects current practice at the firm. In this model, both the product-to-line 
assignments (flexibility configuration) and the capacity allocations are decided before the 
production starts. Then, the allocation decisions as well as the assignment decisions are 
kept fixed throughout the planning horizon. The objective is to minimize the total 
assignment and expected backlogging costs. Details are presented below: 
Indices: 
i, M      = i indexes the product families, which total M in number 
j, N      = j indexes the production lines, which total N in number 
t, T      = t indexes time periods, which total T in number 
k         = k indexes demand realizations for period t 
Data: 
jK = capacity of production line j, per period (in time units) 
ije = amount of time needed to produce one unit of family i on line j 
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ija = assignment/flexibility cost incurred to produce family i on line j 
is        = per unit per period backlogging cost for family i; is > 0 
(.,.)ic  = backlogging cost function for family i (defined below) 
t
id
~        = random demand for product family i in period t
td~        = )~...,,~( 1
t
M
t dd : vector of product family demands in period t 
id
~        = )~...,,~( 1 Tii dd : demand for family i from period 1 to T 
(notation d without “~” refers to a general demand realization) 
ktd ,      = a particular realization of demand vector in period t 
kt
id
,      = a particular realization of demand for family i in period t 
Decision variables: 
ijy       = capacity of line j allocated to produce family i, in production units 
(allocation decisions) 
ijx       = 1 if product family i is assigned to line j; 0 otherwise (assignment 
decisions) 
Fixed Allocation Model (FAM): 
, 1 1 1 1
min ( , ) (2.1)
N M M N
f ij ij i i ij ix y j i i j
z a x s Ec y d
= = = =
= +∑∑ ∑ ∑ ?












e y K j
K
y x i j
e






 We use x and y to denote the vectors whose components are ijx  and ijy , 
respectively. 
The first term in the objective function is the assignment cost and the second term 
is the expected total backlogging cost over the planning horizon. The first set of 
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constraints, (2.2), limits the capacity of each line j to jK . Constraints in (2.3) are the 
design constraints, which allow a line to produce only the products that are assigned to it. 
We develop the backlogging function as follows. Let +−= ][),( 111 iiiii yddyb  be the 







 and where +][.  is the larger of its 
argument and 0. Then, for t = 2,…,T the backlog is recursively defined as: 











1 ),...,,(),( . 
Proposition 2.3.1: Assume ,,...,1,~ Midi =  have finite mean and that .,...,1,0 Misi =≥  










)~,()( , is convex.
Proof: It suffices to show that each ),...,,( 1 tiii
t
i ddyb  as defined in (2.5) is convex 
in its first argument. This follows immediately from inductive application of the 
following result: the positive part of a convex function is convex.   
The expectations in the objective function, (2.1), are with respect to the joint 
distributions of .,...,1),~,...,~(~ 1 Middd Tiii ==  If each id~  has a modest number of
realizations then it is straightforward to reformulate FAM as a mixed-integer linear 
program by introducing additional decision variables to linearize the nested positive-part 
terms in the definition of ).,( iii dyc  If id
~  has many realizations or is continuous, then this
is not a viable approach. In this case, by Proposition 2.3.1 we can instead view FAM as a 
mixed-integer nonlinear program (MINLP) whose continuous relaxation is a convex 
nonlinear program. That said, it is not possible to solve such an instance of FAM by 












)~,()( . So, we instead develop a cutting-plane algorithm to solve 
FAM. 
A cutting-plane algorithm for FAM does not require an analytical expression for 
f(y). Rather, it requires that when y is fixed to a specific value we be able to evaluate (or 
estimate) f(y) and its gradient )(yf∇ . In general, f(y) is not differentiable because its 
definition includes nested functions involving positive-part operations. The following 
proposition gives conditions under which f (y) is differentiable.  
 
Proposition 2.3.2: Assume id
~  has finite first moment and has an absolutely continuous 










)~,()(  is differentiable. 
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As a result, )~,( iii dyEc  may be viewed as the recourse function of a stochastic 
program with randomness only on its right-hand side and with complete recourse. 
Theorem 12 of Chapter 3 in Kall (1976) (see also Proposition 20 of Ruszczynski and 
Shapiro, 2003) then gives the desired result under the hypothesis that id
~ has an absolutely 
continuous distribution function.  
Even though f(y) can be differentiable, in general we cannot evaluate it (or its 
gradient) exactly. That said, we can estimate each expectation )~,( iii dyEc  by Monte 
Carlo sampling. Let rid ,
~ , r = 1,…,R be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) as 
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. The following proposition characterizes solutions of FAMR as the 
number of replications R grows large. 
Proposition 2.3.3: Let Rrddd rMrr ,...,1),
~,...,~(~ ,,1 ==  satisfy ),()(lim yfyf RR =∞→ with 
probability one (w.p.1). Let ),( ** RR yx  denote an optimal solution to FAMR. Then every 
limit point of ∞=1
** )},{( RRR yx  solves FAM, w.p.1. 
Proof: Pointwise convergence of )(yfR  is sufficient to ensure the desired result 
since each )~,( iii dyc  is convex and the feasible region defined by (2)-(4) is compact. See 
e.g., Shapiro (2003). 
As indicated above, we will select Rrd ri ,...,1,
~
, = , to be i.i.d. from the 
distribution of id
~ . In this case, the pointwise convergence hypothesis of Proposition 2.3.3
holds by the strong law of large numbers for a sample mean of i.i.d. random variables. In 
what follows, our Monte Carlo sampling scheme will generate the demand observations 
according to this i.i.d. scheme. That said, the hypothesis of Proposition 2.3.3 also holds 
under other Monte Carlo sampling schemes designed to reduce variance. While we will 
not do so here, Proposition 2.3.3 allows us to generate demand observations using, e.g., 
latin hypercube sampling, a control variates scheme or importance sampling, provided 
these sampling schemes ensure )(yfR  is a strongly consistent estimator.   
Proposition 2.3.3 justifies replacing FAM with FAMR when the number of 
replications R is sufficiently large. Fortunately, given the definition of )~,( iii dyc we can 
choose R quite large. For any finite R, )(yfR  is convex but nonsmooth. We can solve 
FAMR using Kelley’s (1960) cutting-plane method, adapted to deal with integer-valued 
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decision variables x (see, e.g., Westerlund and Pettersson 1995). At iteration κ of the 
algorithm the following problem (Master-κ ) is solved: 
 
, , 1 1
min (2.6)
N M
ij ijx y j i
z a xκ θ θ= == +∑∑
          s.t. (2.2)-(2.4) 
( ) ( ), 1,..., 1, (2.7)l l lRf y g y y lθ κ≥ + − = −
where ),( lR
l yfg ∂∈ i.e., lg  is a subgradient of )(yf R  at y = .ly  
The cutting-plane algorithm at each iteration forms a first-order Taylor 
approximation, i.e., a cut, at the current iterate : ( ) ( ).l l l lRy f y g y y+ −  In what follows, 
the cut’s gradient, lg , and its intercept ( )l l lRf y g y− , will be called cut coefficients. 
When we solve Master-κ  we therefore have an outer piecewise linear approximation 
of ( )Rf y  given by 1,..., 1max [ ( ) ( )]
l l l
Rl K
f y g y y
= −
+ − . The formulation in Master-κ  linearizes 
this piecewise linear approximation via decision variable θ  and constraints (2.7). The 
details of the algorithm are given in Figure 2.2. 
 
Step 0: Initialize convergence tolerance 0>ε , iteration count 1κ = , zκ = +∞ , the 
number 
            of replications R and let rid ,
~ , r = 1,…,R  be i.i.d. as id
~  for each Mi ,...,1= . 
  
Step 1: Solve Master-κ  to obtain solution ( , )x yκ κ  and value zκ .  
 






z a x f yκ κκ
= =
= +∑∑ . If z zκ κ<  then let z zκ κ=  and 
* *( , ) ( , ).x y x yκ κ=  If ( ) /z z zκκ κ ε− ≤  then stop and output ).,( ** yx  
 
Step 3: Let ( )Rg f y
κ κ∈∂ . Add the following cut to the master problem, 
( ) ( )Rf y g y y
κ κ κθ ≥ + − ; Set  1κ κ= +  and go to step 1. 
 
Figure 2.2: A Solution Method for FAM 
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The values of ε  and R should be selected so that they are commensurate. It is 
unnecessary to have the sampling error 1/ 2[ ( ( )]RVar f y ε<< , and it does not  make sense 
to solve to a precise level of ε  when the sampling error exceeds the precision. Of course, 
the sampling error can vary with y, but by choosing a reasonable allocation we can obtain 
an estimate of the sampling error and then choose ε  and R accordingly. This could be 
formalized in a two-stage procedure but we will not do so. In our computational results in 
Section 2.5 we use 510−=ε and 610=R . Similar to the method given here, Atlason et al. 
(2004) present an Infinitesimal Perturbation Analysis (IPA)-based cutting-plane method 
to solve a staff scheduling problem.  
2.4. DYNAMIC ALLOCATION MODEL 
In this section, we develop a time-dynamic allocation model. Like the FAM of the 
previous section, product-to-line assignments, i.e., the process flexibility configuration, 
must be decided at the beginning of the planning horizon. Unlike the FAM, in our 
dynamic allocation model (DAM) the capacity allocation decisions can adapt to the 
demand in each period, i.e., the firm has operational flexibility not present in the model 
of the previous section. DAM is a multistage stochastic program with binary first stage 
decision variables representing product-to-line assignments. Each of the subsequent 
stages is constrained by these first stage binary decisions, and optimizes over continuous 
decision variables capturing period-by-period capacity allocation decisions and 




ib = backlogged demand for family i in period t 
t
ijy = capacity of line j allocated to produce family i in period t 
ibi ∀≡ 00  
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Throughout this section, we assume that td~ , t = 1,…,T are independent and
identically distributed random vectors. The independence assumption is key to our 
approach but the identically-distributed assumption can be easily relaxed. 












    (2.8) 
s.t.   ,,},1,0{ jixij ∀∈












ttt dbxhEbsdbxh ttt             (2.9a) 











t t t t











y b d b i
e y K j
y b Y x b d
K
y x i j
e









            (2.9b) 
where .01 ≡+Th  
In the DAM, the process flexibility configuration is selected via x in (2.8) to 
minimize the cost of that configuration plus the expected operations cost to the planning 
horizon. That operations cost is captured in the recursion specified by (2.9), which takes x 
as input, and makes the allocation and resulting backlogging decisions in each time 
period, t = 1,…,T. When selecting x the demand process Tt
td 1}
~{ =  is known only through
its distribution. When deciding ty and tb in period t, we know the current period’s 
demand realization, td~ , demand backlog from the previous period, 1−tb  and the
distribution governing the future demand process, }.~,...,~{ 1 Tt dd +  So, the timing of when
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we make the capacity allocation decisions, ty , and when we observe the random demand 
differs from FAM; we have greater operational flexibility here. Beyond this important 
difference, the structural form of the constraints in (2.9b) is the same as that in the FAM. 
Multistage stochastic programs, such as the one in (2.8)-(2.9) represent significant 
computational challenges, even when the demands in each period are independent. When 
the demands have a continuous distribution, as we will assume in our computational 
study in the next section, model (2.8)-(2.9) is intractable. Even if td~  has a finite number
of realizations in each time period, the size of the scenario tree grows exponentially with 
the number of time periods, and hence the model quickly becomes intractable. The fact 
that DAM has binary first stage decision variables adds further computational challenges. 
When an exact solution of a multistage stochastic program is not computationally 
viable, we turn to approximations. If td~  has a continuous distribution then we could
replace it with a manageable number of realizations in each time period. There are 
multiple ways to generate such discrete approximations, and we will do so using Monte 
Carlo sampling. In the literature, Monte Carlo schemes for stochastic programming can 
be classified as either being “internal” or “external”. In the latter, one replaces 
expectations with, e.g., sample means based on i.i.d. observations and then uses a 
“standard” algorithm to solve the resulting approximating problem. Here, the sampling is 
external to the algorithm. In an internal sampling scheme, an algorithm for deterministic 
optimization is adapted to the stochastic setting replacing evaluations and gradients by 
sampling-based estimators. Here, the sampling is carried out with new, and often 
independent, observations drawn at each iteration of the algorithm. 
Higle and Sen (1991) develop an internal sampling algorithm for two-stage 
stochastic linear programs that is an adaptation of the L-Shaped decomposition method of 
van Slyke and Wets (1969). In the multistage setting, the internal sampling algorithms of 
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Pereira and Pinto (1991), Chen and Powell (1999), Linowsky and Philpott (2005) and 
Donohue and Birge (2006) are adaptations of nested L-shaped decomposition (Birge 
1985). They are designed for multistage stochastic linear programs with inter-stage 
independence and a modest number of realizations in each stage.  
The requirement of having a modest number of realizations in each stage 
precludes direct application of the multistage algorithms discussed above to our DAM. 
So, we proceed in this section in four steps as follows: First we construct what we call an 
empirical scenario tree by replacing the true demand distribution at each stage by an 
empirical distribution constructed using Monte Carlo sampling. We call the dynamic 
allocation problem defined on this empirical tree EDAM. We construct the empirical tree 
in Section 2.4.1 so that EDAM is amenable to be solved using the multistage internal-
sampling based algorithms we point to in the previous paragraph.  Second, in Section 
2.4.2 we extend the sampling-based algorithm of Pereira and Pinto (1991) to solve 
EDAM. We could also extend the other algorithms mentioned above but for simplicity 
we only consider the algorithm of Pereira and Pinto.  Their algorithm requires extension 
because in addition to the standard staircase structure in which backlogged inventory is 
carried between adjacent time periods we also have binary first stage decisions, 
governing the process flexibility configuration, that are carried to all of the periods to the 
time horizon. This requires that we construct a non-standard cut, which we describe in 
detail. Third, a solution to a multistage stochastic program is a policy, and in Section 
2.4.3 we describe how we can construct a feasible policy for DAM using the cuts 
generated in solving EDAM. In the forth and final step, we seek to establish whether our 
feasible policy is near-optimal. To do so, we first describe how to estimate the policy’s 
expected cost in Section 2.4.4. Then, in Section 2.4.5 we show how to construct a 
confidence interval on the policy’s optimality gap using a lower bound estimator again 
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formed using EDAM. The solution validation ideas we use rely on Chiralaksanakul and 
Morton (2003), but have not been previously extended to problems with integer design 
decisions or decisions that directly affect all the time periods. 
2.4.1. Empirical Scenario Tree Construction 
In order to generate a sample scenario tree, we generate a set (indexed by S) of 
i.i.d. observations of the demand Skd k ∈,~ ,1 , in period 1. We will then use this same set
of observations to represent the realizations in each time period t. So, the first period 
sampled observations are Skd k ∈,~ ,1 . And, in period 2, each of these realizations will
have Skdd kk ∈= ,~~ ,1,2 , as its descendent nodes, etc. In this way, our empirical scenario
tree, like its “true” counterpart, exhibits inter-stage independence with identically 
distributed demand in each period. 
If the true demand had 1 2, ,..., Td d d? ? ? independent but not identically distributed 
then in period t = 2 we would draw 2, , ,kd k S∈? and these |S| observations would form the 
descendent nodes of all 1, ,kd k S∈? . Repeating in this way the empirical scenario tree 
would, like the original, exhibit inter-stage independence. 
Hence, the dynamic allocation model defined on an empirical scenario tree 
(EDAM) takes the following form after each expectation is replaced with the 
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                              s.t.  .),~,(),( ,1 SkdbYby ktttt ∈∀∈ −  
where .0ˆ 1 ≡+Th  
Solving EDAM is of central importance in generating near optimal polices for 
DAM. Next, we present a method using internal sampling to provide near optimal 
solutions to EDAM with reasonable effort. 
2.4.2. An Algorithm to Solve EDAM  
In this section, we develop a multistage nested decomposition algorithm to solve 
EDAM. Our algorithm is based on the idea of sequentially approximating the expected 
cost-to-go function in each stage with a piecewise linear function, similar to what we 
described in Section 2.3. Hence, at each stage one may use the approximate cost-to-go 
function to simply make the x and ty  decisions. Further, we note that due to the presence 
of first-stage binary assignment decisions which feed all the subsequent periods’ 
problem, EDAM is significantly harder to solve then a standard multistage stochastic 
linear program. See Birge and Louveaux (1997) for a detailed review of multistage 
stochastic programming models and algorithms.  
Here we present an algorithm extending that of Pereira and Pinto (1991) to handle 
binary first stage decisions which feed all the subsequent periods. First, the algorithm 
decomposes EDAM into a subproblem for each time period, including what we label t = 
0, where x is selected. Then, the algorithm iteratively applies forward and backward 
phases. During a single forward pass, a demand realization rtd ,~  is drawn from the sample 
set S and the stage t subproblem is solved, using the current piecewise linear 
approximation of the cost-to-go function. In the first iteration this subproblem is solved 
myopically but as the algorithm proceeds the piecewise linear function better 
approximates the sample-mean functions in (2.10) and (2.11). Solving the subproblems 
leads to a backlog demand, rtb , , being passed to stage t+1, where an independent 
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realization rtd ,1~ +  is drawn from S, until we reach the final period T. Hence, during the
forward phase the multistage problem is solved along a given sample path of demand, 
knowing only the approximate cost-to-go function, and not the future period demands, at 
each period. 
During the backward phase of the algorithm, given rTb ,1−  the stage T subproblem 
is first solved for all Sd rT ∈,~ and an optimality cut is passed to stage T-1. Next, given
rTb ,2−  the stage T-1 subproblem is solved for all Sd rT ∈− ,1~  and an optimality cut, i.e., a
first-order Taylor approximation, is passed to stage T-2. This backward pass continues 
until a cut is passed to stage t = 1 and finally to t = 0. The cuts accumulated in each stage 
represent a piecewise outer linearization of the cost-to-go function at that stage. Hence in 
each iteration of the algorithm, assignment decisions, x, are selected to minimize the 
objective (2.10) where the cost-to-go function is replaced by a piecewise linear 
approximation. As we iterate, the approximating functions become more precise and 
hence the assignment and allocation policies improve.  
Upon termination, the feasible policy obtained by the algorithm is evaluated by 
drawing independent demand samples from set S to provide an upper bound estimate. 
The details of the algorithm are given below. We will compactly denote inner products, 
like the first term in the objective function of (2.8), via ax. 
Solution Algorithm for EDAM: 
See Appendix A for the notation and the details of cut calculations, i.e., how to 
compute the cut coefficients , ,( , )t l t lμ β  and ,t lα . These are the cut gradient terms for x 
and tb  in period t, along with the cut intercept term in period t, respectively. They form 
the analogy of constraint (2.7) for the multistage setting.    
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Forward Pass: 
Repeat for each replication r = 1,…,R 
Repeat for each period t = 0,…,T-1 









 s.t.    ,1,...,1,0,01 −=≥+ rlx ll αμθ
NMx ×∈ }1,0{
for rrx ,1ˆ,ˆ θ .  
If 0>t ,




min +++ ttby sbttt θθ
   s.t.    1,...,1ˆ,,,1 −=+≥++ rlxb rltlttltt μαβθ  
)~,ˆ,ˆ(),( ,,1 rtrtrtt dbxYby −∈
for )ˆ,ˆ( ,, rtrt by
(For t=T, the cut constraints and 1+Tθ are absent) 
Backward Recursion: 
Repeat for t = T, T-1,…,1 




min +++ ttby sbttt θθ
   s.t.    1,...,1ˆ,,,1 −=+≥++ rlxb rltlttltt μαβθ  
           1, ,ˆˆ( , ) ( , , )t t r t r t ry b Y x b d−∈ ?  
 Store the optimal dual multipliers.  
Calculate the cut gradient and the intercept, and add the following cut to 
period   t-1: 
rrtrttrtt xb ˆ,1,11,1 −−−− +≥+ μαβθ  if t > 1, 
rr x ,0,01 αμθ ≥+ otherwise. 
Calculate lower bound for replication r: 
rr
r xaLB
,1ˆˆ θ+= ,  
            Let r = r+1, and repeat for a new forward run. 
Upper Bound Estimation: 
             Repeat for each r = 1,…, R′   






Sample a demand vector rtd ,~  from sample set S.
1
,, 1
min +++ ttby sbttt θθ
   s.t.    Rlxb Rltlttltt ,...,1ˆ,,,1 =+≥++ μαβθ  
)~,ˆ,ˆ(),( ,,1 rtrtRtt dbxYby −∈
  for )ˆ,ˆ( ,, rtrt by  












The algorithm we have just specified approximately solves EDAM. When the 
algorithm terminates the gap between LBR and the upper bound estimator, 
~
UB , provides 
a probabilistic measure of the optimality of the identified policy for EDAM. For our 
purposes, it is not necessary to solve EDAM exactly, since EDAM is already an 
approximation of DAM. In practice, the selection of R, i.e., the termination condition of 
the algorithm, is decided by numerical experimentation. R may be increased if the gap 
between the lower bound and the upper bound estimate is not sufficiently close. The 
parameter R′  used for estimating the cost of the policy in EDAM is typically selected 
with R′>R because we can afford to run more sample forward passes in this phase then 
combined backward and forward passes, because of the more expensive backward 
recursion.  
The output of the algorithm is a policy for EDAM. Specifically, at the end of the 
algorithm, the process flexibility configuration is given by the solution x to the stage 0 
subproblem. Note that the subproblems replace the exact cost-to-go function with a set of 
linear cuts that have accumulated in the course of the algorithm. And, for the allocation 
policy, we first solve the stage 1 subproblem with its cuts, given x and 1~d  to obtain y1
and b1 (note that when doing so Tdd ~,...,~2  need not be sampled yet). Next, we solve the
stage 2 subproblem with its cuts, given x, b1 and 2~d , etc., until we finally solve the stage
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T subproblem for yT. A lower bound on zˆ , the optimal value of EDAM, is given by LBr 
because the cuts form an outer linearization of the cost-to-go functions determined in 
EDAM. 
As indicated, the cuts accumulated during the backward passes of the algorithm 
are used to define a policy for EDAM. In Section 2.4.3, we show how these same cuts 
can similarly be used to construct a near optimal policy for the original problem DAM. 
And, the final lower bound, RLB , is used in Section 2.4.5 to generate a probabilistic lower 
bound for the true optimal value of the DAM.  
2.4.3. Near Optimal Policy Generation for DAM 
In this section, we present a procedure for generating a near optimal feasible 
policy for DAM. For this purpose, we first generate an empirical scenario tree and the 
associated EDAM. The approximate model (EDAM) is then solved with the algorithm 
given in Section 2.4.2. As we have described, when the algorithm terminates, the 
subproblems at each stage t contain a set of cuts generated during the backward passes of 
the algorithm. Since these cuts approximate the cost-to-go functions of EDAM, they may 
also be used to approximate the cost-to-go functions of DAM. Hence, they define a 
feasible policy for the actual model, DAM as well. 
In particular, we use the following optimization models to generate a good 
feasible policy for DAM: 
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s.t.   ,,...,1,0,01 Rlx ll =≥+ αμθ   
.}1,0{ NMx ×∈  
For t = 1,…,T:   
1
,, 1
min +++ ttby sbttt θθ
    s.t.    ,,...,1,,,1 Rlxb ltlttltt =+≥++ μαβθ
),~,,(),( 1 tttt dbxYby −∈
  (For t=T, the cut constraints and 1+Tθ are absent) 
Figure 2.3: Models for Generating a Feasible Policy for DAM 
Note that β , α  and μ  contain the cut coefficients and R is the total number of 
cuts obtained while solving EDAM with the method of Section 2.4.2. 
Our policy determines decisions ),( tt by  to be made at each period t = 1,…,T, 
(and decision x at period t = 0),  by solving the models in Figure 2.3 for a given period t 
and state ),ˆ( 1 tt db − . The overall procedure for generating a near optimal feasible policy is 
summarized below: 
Step 1: Construct an empirical scenario tree and the associated  
empirical model, EDAM, as explained in Section 2.4.1. 
Step 2: Solve EDAM with the algorithm of Section 2.4.2. 
Step 3: When the algorithm terminates, store the generated cuts at  
each stage of the problem. 
Step 4: Using the cuts from Step 3, construct and solve the sequence of 
optimization problems in Figure 2.3 to find a feasible policy. 
         Figure 2.4: Feasible Policy Generation Procedure for DAM 
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2.4.4. Policy Cost Estimation (Upper Bound Estimation) 
Once a feasible policy is identified for DAM, the next step is to evaluate its cost 
to obtain an upper bound on the optimal value of DAM, *z . In particular, for a given 
demand sample path i, )~,...,~( ,,1 iTi dd , our policy generates a stream of feasible solutions,








,,,1 )~(ˆˆ)~,...,~( . Since the identified policy is not
necessarily optimal, the expected cost of the policy exceeds DAM’s optimal value, i.e., 
*1 )~,...,~(~ zddEUUE T ≥= .
Next, to obtain a point estimate of UE ~ , we generate η  i.i.d. demand sample
paths, )~,...,~( ,,1 iTi dd , i = 1,…,η  and evaluate the cost of the policy, for each sample path.
Then, an approximate one-sided )%1(100 α−  confidence interval for UE ~  is


















−−= . Here, αz  is the 
(1-α)-level quantile for a standard normal. In general, we may use t-distribution quantiles 
but the values of η  we use will be sufficiently large so that the difference is negligible. 
2.4.5. Lower Bound Estimation 
This section explains how to develop a probabilistic lower bound for *z , the 
optimal value of DAM. Our goal is to combine this bound with the one in Section 2.4.4 
and to develop a confidence interval for the optimality gap of the policy generated in 
Section 2.4.3. Our lower bound estimator is based on the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.4.1: Let L~  denote the final lower bound generated by the algorithm of
Section 2.4.2 for the optimal value of an EDAM. Then, LEz ~* ≥ .
Proof:  Let zˆ  be the optimal value of EDAM for a particular scenario tree Γ . 
From Theorem 2 of Chiralaksanakul and Morton (2003), zEz ˆ* ≥ . Since Lz ~ˆ ≥ , we
conclude that LEzEz ~ˆ* ≥≥ .
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Next, we develop a point estimate of LE~ to establish a lower bound for *z . Hence,
as in the previous section, we generate multiple replicates of L~ . In particular, we
construct ν  i.i.d. sample scenario trees, νΓΓ ,...,1 , and the associated EDAMs as 
explained in Section 2.4.1. Then, we solve these problems with the method of Section 
2.4.2 to obtain the lower bound estimators νLL ,...,1 . 
Then, by the standard central limit theorem for i.i.d. random variables, an 
approximate one-sided 100(1-α )% confidence interval for *z  (also for LE~ ) is given by


















−−= . Finally, by 
combining this confidence interval with the one in Section 2.4.4, using the Boole-
Bonferroni inequality, we obtain a confidence interval for the optimality gap of the 
feasible policy, i.e., for *~ zUE − . Specifically, an approximate 100(1-2α )% confidence
interval for *~ zUE −  is given by ]//)(,0[ νη αανη lu szszLU ++− + .
2. 5. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The purpose of the computational study in this section is two-fold. First, in 
Section 2.5.1, we investigate the value of operational flexibility by comparing and 
analyzing the expected performance of the dynamic and fixed allocation models under 
different real-life settings. Then, in Section 2.5.2, under dynamic operating policies, we 
specifically focus on the value of process flexibility in a multi-period decision 
environment, ignoring the cost of the assignments. Further, the computational results 
show that our algorithms are very effective to solve real-sized problems. Below for 
simplicity, we assume that production of a unit of any product requires the same amount 
of capacity and the production lines are identical, i.e., 1 ,ije i j= ∀  and jK K j= ∀ , for 
the computational analyses. 
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2.5.1. Value of Operational Flexibility: Comparing DAM and FAM  
In this section, we numerically compare and analyze FAM and DAM developed 
in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. In our experimental design we use ),(~~ 2iii Nd σμ .
We consider two factors that scale: (i) the variability of the demand ( β ), and (ii) its 








~ρ . Let ),(~~ ρβii dd = . Table 2.2 contains =iBase,μ E( id~ ) and
=2 ,iBaseσ Var )~( id , i.e., the mean and the variance of ),(~ ρβid , for 1== ρβ . More 
generally, iBaseidE ,),(
~ ρμρβ =  and Var iBaseid ,22),(~ βσρρβ = . In this way, the coefficient
of variation of  ),(~ ρβid  is constant as we scale ρ  and grows in β .  
We conjecture that these two factors should have a significant impact on the 
performance of the policies under investigation. More specifically, we consider three 
mean-demand to capacity ratios ( ρ  = 0.933, 1 and 1.067), as well as three levels of 
demand variability ( β  = 1, 3 and 5). The demand data in this study is generated to 
simulate the real situation at the firm. In particular, the product families in Table 2.2 with 
higher mean demand have lower coefficient of variation. 
Below, we summarize computational results for a problem with M = 6 families, N 
= 3 lines and T = 5 production periods. In practice, the firm has 10-15 product families 
and 6 production lines. However, from the manufacturing point of view similar product 
families that share a significant number of components are aggregated. Moreover, some 
set of production lines are also dedicated for producing certain product families. Hence 
from a practical point of view it is sufficient to consider a 6-product 3-line problem.  
For ease of analysis, we assumed that backlogging cost for all families is si = $1 
while the assignment cost for any line-product pair is aij = $10 (similar results are 
obtained for different combinations of backlog and setup costs). A brief review of 
experimental settings is provided in Tables 2.1-2.2.  
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M N K T ρ  β  
6 3 100 5 {0.933, 1, 1.067} {1, 3, 5} 
Table 2.1: General Experimental Settings 
Base Mean 
( Baseμ ) 
Base Variance 
( 2Baseσ ) 
Family 1 5 0.5 
Family 2 35 22 
Family 3 40 26 
Family 4 45 31 
Family 5 85 97 
Family 6 90 102 
Total 300
Table 2.2: Base Demand Data for the Test Problem ( 1,1 == βρ ) 
The sample setting in Tables 2.1-2.2 is solved (for each experimental setting) 
under both FAM and DAM with the algorithms explained in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, 
respectively. Both of the solution methods are implemented in C++ using Concert 
Technology and CPLEX callable library on a Dell Precision 530 Workstation with Intel 
Xeon 1.8GHz processor and 1GB of RAM. From a computational point of view, under 
our experimental settings, it takes around 7 minutes to solve a problem instance under 
FAM. Identifying a near optimal policy for a problem instance under DAM takes around 
20 minutes while forming a confidence interval on the optimality gap, for the identified 
policy, takes 6-7 hours. (See Appendix B for the computational parameters used for the 
solution method of DAM.) 
The optimal operating costs obtained under FAM are presented in Table 2.3. 
These are estimates obtained with a sample size of R=106. The associated standard 
deviations are about 0.03% of the sample mean estimates. In our example, the operating 
cost increases with demand variability and the ratio of mean-demand to capacity. In 
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addition, the introduction of variability (to a deterministic system) has the highest impact 
on the operating costs when ρ =1. Intuitively, when we have plenty of capacity, demand 
variability can be buffered with capacity up to some extent, similarly when we have the 
capacity well below the demand then the variability will not affect the expected loss too 
much, since the capacity is already fully utilized. 
βρ /  Deterministic ( 0=β ) Low Variability ( 1=β ) Moderate Variability ( 3=β ) High Variability ( 5=β ) 
0.933 70 126.45 214.20 281.33
1 80 238.95 353.58 431.98
1.067 370 443.81 547.68  626.33 
Table 2.3: Optimal Operating Cost under Fixed Allocation Model (zf) 
The results for the dynamic allocation model are summarized in the next four 
tables. In Table 2.4, we provide the operating cost estimates of the near optimal policy 
identified by the solution method of Section 2.4.3. Then, in Table 2.5, in order to quantify 
the quality of the identified policy, we provide the lower bound estimates on the true 
optimal value of DAM as explained in Section 2.4.5. Finally, we provide the optimality 
gap estimates of the identified policies in Table 2.6. (In Table 2.6, %Gap is calculated by 
dividing the length of the confidence interval by the mean upper bound estimate, U .) 
In the worst case, the optimality gap of the identified policy is around 5% of the 
estimated cost and for low and medium variability cases the gap is less than 2.5%. Hence, 
we conclude that, for our example, the approach presented in Section 2.4 generates near 
optimal policies for DAM. In addition, since our gap generation mechanism is based on 
sampling, it is natural to observe that the algorithm performance slightly degrades as the 
variability of demand grows. 
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)1( =β  
Moderate Variability  
)3( =β  
High Variability 
)5( =β  
ηU us ηU us ηU us ηU us
0.933 70 0 84.48 0.07 107.59 0.29 132.16 0.49 
1 80 0 153.91 0.47 207.41 0.82 248.25 1.06 
1.067 370 0 386.88 0.81 419.46 1.34 453.74 1.62 
Table 2.4: Cost of the Identified Feasible Policy for DAM ( usU ,η ) 




)1( =β  
Moderate Variability 
)3( =β  
High Variability 
)5( =β  
νL ls νL ls νL ls νL ls
0.933 70 0 84.56 0.32 107.37 0.92 128.91 1.44 
1 80 0 153.90 0.85 207.57 1.50 245.17 3.84 
1.067 370 0 386.67 0.60 420.07 1.20 445.51 1.88 
Table 2.5: Lower Bound for the Optimal Operating Cost of DAM ( lsL ,ν ) 
βρ /   Deterministic ( 0=β ) 
Low Variability 
( 1=β ) 
Moderate Variability 
( 3=β ) 
High Variability 
( 5=β ) 
95%CI % Gap 95%CI % Gap 95%CI % Gap 95%CI % Gap 
0.933 N/A N/A [0, 0.76] 0.90 [0, 2.60] 2.42 [0, 7.02] 5.31 
1 N/A N/A [0, 2.61] 1.69 [0, 4.54] 2.19 [0,12.70] 5.12 
1.067 N/A N/A [0, 2.99] 0.77 [0, 4.97] 1.18 [0,15.08] 3.32 
Table 2.6: Approximate 95% Confidence Intervals for the Optimality Gap of the Feasible 
Policy 
Comparing the results in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, it is clear that operational 
flexibility (i.e., using a dynamic allocation policy) significantly reduces the negative 
impact of variability on the operating cost. For example, under the low demand setting, 
moving from a deterministic system to a low variability system, the operating cost under 
DAM increases from $70 to $84.48 whereas, under FAM, it increases from $70 to 
$126.45. 
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In particular, it becomes more beneficial to use DAM instead of FAM as the 
system becomes more variable and the mean-demand to capacity ratio approaches one. 
The maximum difference is observed when 5=β and 1=ρ . Table 2.7 summarizes the 
absolute benefits of using DAM over FAM under our experimental settings. 
βρ /  Deterministic ( 0=β ) Low Variability ( 1=β ) Moderate Variability ( 3=β ) High Variability ( 5=β ) 
0.933 0 41.97 106.61 149.17
1 0 85.04 146.17 183.73
1.067 0 56.93 128.22 172.59
Table 2.7: Expected Absolute Benefits of using DAM over FAM (zf -U ) 
Intuitively, if the mean demand is well above the capacity, then operational 
flexibility (i.e., using DAM instead of FAM) does not provide much benefit since the 
system capacity is already fully utilized and dynamically changing the allocations does 
not help to decrease the expected backlog. Similarly, when the mean demand is well 
below the capacity, then again operational flexibility is not very beneficial. On the other 
hand, if the capacity is well-balanced with respect to the demand, then there is significant 
opportunity for decreasing the expected backlog by revising the allocations periodically. 
In addition, under all demand levels, the absolute benefits of operational flexibility are 
increasing with the variability of the system. 
In Table 2.8, we provide the expected percentage benefits of using DAM over 
FAM. The effect of variability on the percentage and absolute benefits is similar: the 
percentage benefits also increase with the variability of the system but, from moderate to 
high variability the increase is not very significant. The impact of capacity availability is 
slightly different in this case, i.e., the percentage benefits under 933.0=ρ  and 1=ρ  are 
close to each other and moreover, for moderate and high variability cases percentage 
benefits under 933.0=ρ  are higher. This result may be interpreted by analogy with a 
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queueing system with a relatively high traffic intensity of 933.0=ρ . In this setting, DAM 
has opportunities to adaptively change allocations to decrease the backlog. In addition, 
since for 933.0=ρ  we have some slack capacity, DAM is more efficient in decreasing 
backlog than the 1=ρ  case. However, as explained in the previous paragraph, as ρ  
approaches zero, absolute and percentage difference in the performance of DAM and 
FAM shirks to zero. 
βρ /  Deterministic ( 0=β ) Low Variability ( 1=β ) Moderate Variability ( 3=β ) High Variability ( 5=β ) 
0.933 0 33.19 49.77 53.02
1 0 35.59 41.34 42.53
1.067 0 12.83 23.41 27.56
Table 2.8: Expected Percentage Benefits of using DAM over FAM (zf -U ) / zf 
From a computational point of view, under FAM, it is possible to solve much 
larger problem instances, e.g., problems up to 20 families and 10 production lines, in an 
effective manner. Under DAM it is also possible to quickly identify good feasible 
solutions for these problems. However, constructing a confidence interval for the 
optimality gap (under DAM) becomes computationally challenging as the problem size 
grows large.  
On the other hand, given a certain assignment decision, i.e., with the x-decision 
pre-specified, DAM can quickly identify a near optimal allocation policy. Therefore, 
when solving large problems under DAM, using the assignment decision identified from 
the FAM may be a good heuristic approach. Another approach can involve aggregating 
the large problem to a manageable size and then using the optimal assignment solution of 
this approximate problem in the actual model. 
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2.5.2. Value of Process Flexibility 
In the previous sections, for a given operating policy, we have concentrated on the 
joint optimization of process flexibility and capacity allocation decisions, by trading off 
the cost and benefits of process flexibility in a multi-period decision framework. 
Nevertheless, in practice, a firm may already have an incumbent process flexibility 
configuration (which may be difficult to fully reconfigure) and may be interested in 
improving over this current scheme by adding new links to it. Hence, the firm first needs 
to assess the value of its current flexibility configuration since the additional value of the 
new links will be traded off with their costs.  
In this section, we specifically investigate the value of process flexibility, under 
different operating policies. In a single period model, it has been shown that a little 
process flexibility, namely a partial assignment scheme configured as a “chain”, achieves 
almost all the benefits of full process flexibility (see Jordan and Graves 1995). Ignoring 
the cost of assignments in our case, allows us to extend the results of Jordan and Graves 
(1995) to a multi-period decision framework in which the firm must also decide how to 
allocate capacity to demand over time, i.e., the allocation (operating) policies.  
First, we consider an optimal dynamic allocation policy, where the firm decides 
allocations to minimize its expected backlogging cost over the full planning horizon (as 
in DAM). In this case, we solve the DAM for a given flexibility configuration to find the 
optimal allocations. Next, we consider a myopic dynamic allocation policy, where the 
firm minimizes its backlogging cost myopically in each period. We label this latter policy 
MDAM.  In this case, the allocation policy is not forward-looking, but the firm still has 
full operational flexibility when deciding capacity allocations over time. Myopic 
allocation policies are quite common in practice, since they are easy to identify, 
understand and implement. 
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We start with an example with 6 families, 6 production lines (each with 100 units 
of capacity) and 10 time periods. Demand (again, normally distributed) and backlogging 
cost information for each family is provided in Table 2.9. 
Mean Variance Unit backlogging cost ($) 
Family 1 30 80 1.01 
Family 2 80 500 1.01 
Family 3 80 550 1.01 
Family 4 150 1000 1.005 
Family 5 110 600 1 
Family 6 150 1200 1 
Total 600
Table 2.9: Demand and Cost Data for the Test Problem 
Next, for this example, we compare the value of the partial-flexibility 
configuration shown in Figure 2.5.a to the full process flexibility case given in Figure 
2.5.b. Here, the comparison is with respect to expected backlogging cost. In practice, 
Figure 2.5.a may represent the current operating configuration of the firm, or it may be 
implied by the cost of assignments. The corresponding results are summarized in Table 
2.10.  
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  Figure 2.5.a: Partial Process Flexibility Figure 2.5.b: Full Process Flexibility 
Backlogging Cost Relative Difference 
Allocation Policy/Process Flexibility Partial-Flex Case Full-Flex Case (Partial-Full)/Full 
Optimal Allocation (DAM) 1281.21 834.56 53.52% 
Myopic Allocation (MDAM) 1523.06 834.56 82.50% 
(MDAM-DAM)/MDAM 15.88% 0.00%
Table 2.10: Value of Flexibility Configurations in Figure 2.5.a and 2.5.b under DAM and 
MDAM 
Table 2.10 shows that under the optimal dynamic allocation policy, the expected 
backlogging cost of the partial configuration is 53.52% higher than the cost of the full 
flexibility configuration. However, this difference in backlogging cost grows up to 
82.5% under the myopic dynamic allocation policy. Hence, the value of the partial 
configuration is significantly reduced under the myopic allocation case. Indeed, the 
expected backlogging cost for the partial configuration is 15.88% higher under the 



























The intuition for the results in Table 2.10 is as follows. Since the myopic 
allocation policy minimizes the immediate cost in every period, when backlogging, 
families are prioritized according to their unit backlogging costs. Hence, in this particular 
example, the policy first tries to backlog F5 and F6, then F4 and then considers the other 
families. However, the assignment configuration in Figure 2.5.a implies that the total 
capacity accessible to produce F4, F5 and F6 (the lower group) is 400 units while their 
total mean demand is 410. On the other hand, for the remaining families, F1, F2 and F3 
(the upper group), the total accessible capacity is 300 units while their expected demand 
is only 190 units. Therefore, backlogging the lower group, when it is also possible to 
backlog the upper group, creates an increased risk of backlogging in the future since such 
a policy further distorts the capacity and demand balance in the system. Hence, the 
myopic solution deteriorates over time.  
The specific backlogging cost scheme in Table 2.10 could be driving the 
difference between myopic and optimal policies, since the cost structure is biased in such 
a way to backlog the families with restricted capacity. To investigate the impact of the 
cost structure, we repeat the example with a reversed backlogging cost scheme, i.e., s1 = 
s2 = s3 =1, s4 =1.005, s5 =1.01 and  s6=1.01.  In this case, priority is given to families F1, 
F2 and F3 which have access to relatively more capacity. However, we still observe a 
7.2% gap between the value of the partial configuration under DAM and MDAM. This is 
because, even though the upper group has more capacity at the beginning of the planning 
horizon, they become more restricted as backlog accumulates over time.  
Moreover, even under an identical backlogging cost scheme (where 
1, 1,...,6is i= = ), the percentage gap between the value of partial configuration under 
DAM and MDAM is still significant at 6.1%. Indeed, the optimal policy identified by 
DAM is a forward-looking policy, which dynamically prioritizes families to backlog by 
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taking the current backlog levels, backlogging cost scheme and the future demand into 
account. Hence, a myopic rule may fail to perform well. 
In addition, we show that this performance gap under DAM and MDAM still 
exists even for very efficient chain flexibility configurations. Below, we investigate the 
value of the partial flexibility scheme, given in Figure 2.5.c, which is configured as a 
chain that achieves almost all the benefits of the full process flexibility under DAM. In 
this second example, to eliminate the influence of the non-identical backlogging cost, we 
further assume that the backlogging cost is identical and equal to $1 for each family.  
Figure 2.5.c: Chain Process Flexibility 
Backlogging Cost Relative Difference 
Allocation Policy/Process Flexibility Chain-Flex Case Full-Flex Case (Chain-Full)/Full 
Optimal Allocation (DAM) 845.625 837.17 1.01% 
Myopic Allocation (MDAM) 873.169 837.17 4.30% 
(MDAM-DAM)/MDAM 3.15% 0.00% 















Table 2.11 shows that, under DAM the chaining configuration in Figure 2.5.c is 
very effective and its cost deviates from the full flexibility case by only 1%. However, 
the effectiveness of the chaining configuration decreases significantly under MDAM and 
its cost deviates from the full flexibility case by more than 4%. Hence, even if a chain is 
very efficient, with respect to full flexibility configuration under DAM, its efficiency may 
reduce significantly under MDAM. 
Next, we extend our computational results to investigate the impact of the number 
periods in the planning horizon. In Table 2.12 below, we analyze the effectiveness of the 
chaining configuration in Figure 2.5.c as the number of periods changes when the 
capacity is well balanced with demand. 
Results for 2-Period Problem 
Backlogging Cost Relative Difference 
Allocation Policy/Process Flexibility Chain-Flex Case Full-Flex Case (Chain-Full)/Full 
Optimal Allocation (DAM) 69.68 68.55 1.64% 
Myopic Allocation (MDAM) 70.27 68.55 2.52% 
(MDAM-DAM)/MDAM 0.85%  
Results for 8-Period Problem 
Backlogging Cost Relative Difference 
Allocation Policy/Process Flexibility Chain-Flex Case Full-Flex Case (Chain-Full)/Full 
Optimal Allocation (DAM) 592.85 586.47 1.09% 
Myopic Allocation (MDAM) 610.68 586.47 4.13% 
(MDAM-DAM)/MDAM 2.92% 
Results for 14-Period Problem 
Backlogging Cost Relative Difference 
Allocation Policy/Process Flexibility Chain-Flex Case Full-Flex Case (Chain-Full)/Full 
Optimal Allocation (DAM) 1435.47 1422.75 0.89% 
Myopic Allocation (MDAM) 1488.63 1422.75 4.63% 
(MDAM-DAM)/MDAM 3.57% 
Table 2.12: Value of Flexibility Configuration in Figure 2.5.c for T = 2, 8 and 14 
There are two important takeaways from Table 2.12. First, the effectiveness of the 
chaining configuration improves as the number of periods grows under DAM. In 
particular, the performance of the chaining configuration deviates from the full flexibility 
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performance by 1.64% for the 2-period problem, while this deviation falls to 0.89% for 
the 14-period case. This is because the system becomes more congested over time as the 
demand is backlogged, and the performance of the chaining and full-flexibility 
configurations converges to each other.  
Second, as the number of periods increases the effectiveness of the chaining 
configuration deteriorates under MDAM. This is due to the fact that it becomes more 
important to look forward when making allocation decisions in longer planning horizons. 
In particular, for a single period problem, a myopic allocation is optimal, but as the 
number of periods grows the sub-optimality of myopic decisions becomes more severe. 
On the other hand, the congestion argument mentioned above also applies here and 
eventually as the number periods keeps growing, the performance of the chaining and full 
flexibility configurations converge to each other under MDAM, as well. In our example, 
up to 14 periods, the first factor dominates and the performance gap increases with the 
number of periods (i.e., the gap increases from 2.52% for the 2-period problem to 4.63% 
for the 14-period problem). All the comparisons we make with respect to Tables 2.12 are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
As a result, we numerically show that the value of process flexibility depends on 
the allocation policy employed by the firm to allocate capacity as the demand is revealed. 
That is, a suboptimal allocation policy, specifically a myopic allocation of capacity to 
demand, may significantly reduce the value of a particular flexibility configuration and 
may increase the need for more process flexibility. Hence, in the production planning 
phase, a firm which uses a myopic allocation policy may require the adoption of more 
process flexibility to hedge against demand uncertainty.  
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2.6. DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, we addressed a challenging real life production and capacity 
management problem which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been addressed in the 
literature so far. The problem is motivated by a high-tech electronic device manufacturer 
which produces multiple product families on multiple flexible assembly lines over 
multiple time periods under demand uncertainty. While our motivation stems from the 
electronics industry, many of the same issues considered here extend to a wide range of 
make-to-order manufacturing environments.  
We specifically modeled and analyzed the value of process and operational 
flexibility, in a multi-period manufacturing environment with stochastic demand. 
Regarding the operational flexibility of the firm, we studied a fixed allocation model 
(FAM), a fully optimized dynamic allocation model (DAM) and a myopically optimized 
dynamic allocation model (MDAM). In the fixed allocation model, which closely 
represents the current practice in our firm, the capacity allocations and flexibility 
decisions are made at the beginning of the first period and are kept fixed throughout the 
planning horizon. We formulated the fixed allocation model as a single-stage stochastic 
program and developed a cutting plane algorithm to solve it. 
In the two dynamic allocation models, the firm may change the allocation 
decisions from period to period after observing the demand. DAM is formulated as a 
multistage stochastic program with binary first stage decision variables. In Section 2.4, 
we outlined a method to obtain near optimal policies for DAM and to generate bounds on 
the optimality gap for a given feasible solution. 
In contrast to FAM, DAM allows the company to utilize operational flexibility. 
Hence, a comparison of these two models provides the value of operational flexibility 
under the optimal choice of process flexibility. The computational results given in 
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Section 2.5.1, show that operational flexibility is most valuable when the demand 
variability is high and the mean-demand and capacity is well-balanced. Hence, a firm 
whose capacity is closely trimmed to the mean of its highly uncertain demand will have 
greater benefit from the dynamic allocation model. 
On the other hand, managing a dynamic allocation system could be more 
complicated than a fixed allocation system, due to the impact of reduced standardization 
and increased need for additional labor, material handling equipment and advanced 
information systems. Hence, the benefits of DAM should be traded off with the cost 
implications of operating a more complex system, before deciding to use either a fixed or 
dynamic allocation system in practice.  
Ignoring the cost of assignments, we also analyze the value of process flexibility 
under optimal and myopic dynamic operating policies. Our computational results show 
that the value of process flexibility may significantly depend on the operating policy 
employed by the firm to allocate capacity, in a multi-period production environment. In 
particular, we show that a flexibility configuration may be significantly over-valued 
under DAM compared to MDAM. That is, if a firm operates with a myopic allocation 
policy after the process flexibility decision, then more process flexibility is needed to 
achieve the same level of expected backlogging cost under MDAM. In other words, a 
firm which uses a myopic allocation policy may require the adoption of more process 
flexibility to hedge against demand uncertainty. 
Finally, the impact of the number of periods is also revealing. If the firm employs 
an optimal dynamic allocation policy, then the effectiveness of a chain flexibility 
configuration improves as the number of periods increases, since the system becomes 
more utilized over time. However, if a myopic operating policy is used, then the myopic 
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solutions become more and more distorted as the number of periods increases and hence, 
the effectiveness of the chain flexibility configuration decreases.  
Regarding our solution methods, we require demand to be independent across 
time when solving DAM, but it need not be identically distributed and we can handle 
inter-product dependencies.  
This is a reasonable assumption, for an MTO firm involved in mass customization 
facing an aggregate demand that comes from a large number of customers who act 
independently. The solution methodology developed for FAM in Section 2.3 also handles 
non-identical and correlated demand both across time and product families. It is also 
straightforward to extend our solution methods to work with non-identical production 
capacities.  
Our computational results suggest that our methods are effective for solving real-
sized problems. Decomposition methods in the two-stage setting have benefitted from the 
use of a trust region or a quadratic proximal term to speed convergence, and we could 
similarly benefit from using these in the multi-stage setting. Moreover, we have based 
our decomposition on the algorithm of Pereira and Pinto (1991) because of its (relative) 
simplicity to describe. Enhanced versions designed to reduce computational effort have 
more recently been developed by Chen and Powell (1999), Linowsky and Philpott (2005) 
and Donohue and Birge (2006), and we could also benefit from these enhancements.  
In the future, we plan to extend this research with a focus on the supply side of the 
problem. Like demand uncertainty, supply uncertainty also creates new motivations for a 
firm to be flexible. Hence, we intend to design multi-stage flexible supply chains which 




Production, Process Investment and Survival of Debt Financed Startup 
Firms 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
According to a study by U.S. Bureau of the Census, it is estimated that over 
700,000 startups are formed every year in the US (Acs and Armington 1998). However, 
only a small proportion of these startups are able to grow their revenues and become 
profitable, and even a smaller proportion of these firms can show continued growth and 
make initial public offerings (Acs and Armington 2003). Startup firms are endowed with 
unique characteristics regarding their asset structure, organization type and growth 
orientation (Gifford 2005), and their operational decisions are often restricted by debt and 
other financial considerations (Berger and Udell 2005).  In practice, most startups have 
very limited access to capital. Most of these firms take on debt and face immediate 
bankruptcy in case of a payback default. Hence, for startup managers it is necessary to 
generate adequate short-term cash flows by exploiting immediate business opportunities 
in order to keep up with the cash outflows and avoid bankruptcy.   
Further, startups are not merely focused on survival. They are also interested in 
long-term growth. Indeed, most startup firms are concerned with their ability to invest in 
research and development (R&D) to improve their products and services (Bhide 2000). 
While such investments may not generate immediate cash flows, they are likely to 
improve the future prospects of the firm. In general, under bankruptcy risk, long-term 
growth and short-term survival are two intimately linked concerns.  A key area of startup 
decision making, involving short term survival against long term growth, is the R&D 
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investment that is aimed at reducing the firm’s unit production cost. In this chapter, we 
investigate the optimal operating decisions of a startup under debt which can invest in 
production to exploit the current business opportunities and generate short-term cash 
flows, or, it can also have a strategy under which it may also invest in process 
improvement to secure future market share and long-term profits. 
We have conducted a series of interviews in order to understand the key 
considerations that affect process R&D investment decisions in startup settings. For 
example, Faradox is an Austin based startup which provides high energy density 
capacitors using its niche production process. Faradox views process development to 
reduce unit cost as a key competitive aspect of its business. During our interviews, the 
VP of business operations at Faradox stated that there was tremendous amount of on-
going research in the field of high energy density capacitors and, it was quite likely that 
new competitors might enter the market by developing new and possibly more efficient 
production processes with lower unit costs. He also acknowledged that while process 
R&D was a key element of long term survival of Faradox, it was very costly and its 
return was highly uncertain. Further, while making investment decisions, predicting 
consumer demand also imposes a serious challenge for this company since the market is 
evolving and the customer base is hard to analyze. Allied issues have also surfaced at 
other Austin startups, AccuWater, AxsTracker, Big Foot Networks etc. Managers at these 
firms indicated that their production and investment decisions are affected by risk created 
by cash flow and technology performance. These concerns are consistent with 
descriptions of startup decision making in the extant literature (Bhide 2000, Shane 2007).   
However, in the absence of a modeling framework, these managers are not able to 
assess their production and process improvement risks, and underlying tradeoffs, with 
precision. This has motivated our effort to formalize a class of factors that have been 
52
central for startup companies while choosing their operating policies regarding 
production and process investment in the presence of survival considerations: 
uncertainties surrounding demand, technological performance and likely entry of 
competition. These factors form the core of our model, and we examine their impact on 
the selection of operating (production and process investment) policies and the survival 
chances of the startup. For ease of exposition, model specification and analysis are 
developed in two stages. In the first stage, we analyze a base case (BC) regarding our 
operating decisions under deterministic demand with a two-period model. BC provides 
benchmarks for more involved models. In the second stage of our analysis, we allow 
stochastic realization of demand. This is termed as the stochastic demand and survival 
constraint (SDSC) case. With stochastic demand, profits after the first period are not 
guaranteed and a probabilistic survival constraint comes into play. SDSC is amenable to 
closed form solutions under limited conditions. Hence, we explore the underlying 
tradeoff between expected profit and bankruptcy risk through a combination of analytical 
and numerical solutions. 
The contributions from our work are threefold. First, we specify a deterministic-
demand model for a debt financed startup firm as a base case, and characterize an optimal 
invest-all-or-nothing policy which derives the conditions for investment in process 
improvement in order to enhance long-term profits. Second, with demand uncertainty and 
the consequent probabilistic survival constraint, we find that such a startup responds to 
the bankruptcy risk by increasing the investment threshold, i.e., the firm looks for more 
favorable market conditions to invest. Indeed, while balancing the bankruptcy risk with 
future growth opportunities, the startup may either behave conservatively (aggressively) 
by investing and producing less (more) than the BC level. In effect, a probabilistic 
survival constraint induces the startup to produce so as to create an operational hedge 
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with respect to its process investment decision. Further, we offer a probabilistic survival 
measure that reflects the riskiness of the startup’s operating decisions under the threat of 
bankruptcy. Third, we explore the impact of the existence of process investment 
opportunities, immediate profitability of the firm and limited debt availability on the 
optimal operating decisions and the allied survival chances. In addition, we have circled 
back to some startup managers and sought their feedback on our findings. We discuss the 
managerial implications of these findings while we synthesize and discuss our results.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a review of 
the related literature. In Section 3.3 we analyze the BC and characterize a closed form 
solution under deterministic demand. We extend our discussion to SDSC case in Section 
3.4. In Section 3.5 we discuss limited debt capacity. Section 3.6 addresses managerial 
implications, limitations and concludes the chapter. 
3.2. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Here we briefly review the streams of literature that are closely related to our 
work: investment in process R&D, startup operations and financing, and the 
entrepreneurial decision-making.  
Investment in process R&D and allied cost reduction and capacity management 
decisions have long been key issues in the manufacturing technology management 
literature (De Groote 1988, Fine and Porteus 1989, Chand et al. 1996, Li and Rajagopalan 
1998, Carrillo and Gaimon 2000, 2004). In addition, a closely aligned literature explores 
the technology adoption decisions (McCardle 1985, Milgrom and Roberts 1990, Fine and 
Freund 1990, Gupta and Loulou 1998). R&D investment under technology uncertainty in 
a single firm setting (Balcer and Lippman 1984, Kornish, 1999) and in competitive 
settings (Mamer and McCardle 1987) usually yield an “all-or-nothing” type of policy: 
adopt the current best technology if the gap between current and state-of-the-art 
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technology exceeds a certain threshold. In this chapter, we will show that such “all-or-
nothing” policies apply under limited conditions in startup settings to avoid bankruptcy. 
We illustrate that the incorporation of financial limitations in a startup setting lead to joint 
consideration of quantity and process investment decisions.  
A recently growing body of literature deals with decision models involving the 
financing and operations of startups. Archibald et al. (2002) argue that if the startups are 
more interested in surviving than maximizing their profits, they should employ 
conservative strategies. On the contrary, we show that profit maximizing startups under a 
survival constraint could follow aggressive strategies when they have investment 
opportunities. Babich and Sobel (2004) provide a model to maximize the likelihood of a 
successful IPO for debt financed startups while Buzacott and Zhang (2004) adopt an asset 
based financing scheme for small and start-up firms. However, they do not explicitly 
model for strategic investment or competition which is central to the long term growth 
and survival of startups. Swinney et al. (2006) build the case on how competition 
between startup and established firms differs from competition between two established 
firms and show that a startup’s preference to increase its survival affects the competition. 
However, they consider a single period model with a survival maximizing startup. 
Joglekar and Levesque (2009) analyze the distribution of venture capital between product 
related R&D and marketing, but do not account for either survival constraint or 
competition explicitly. Therefore, our research extends a growing literature on the 
theories of startup driven R&D and operational practices (Shane and Ulrich 2004).  
Finally, an established topic of research in the entrepreneurship literature explores 
risk bearing as the key economic role of entrepreneurs. On one hand, Kihlstom and 
Laffont (1979) and Cramer et al. (2002) show that entrepreneurs are more risk seeking, 
and on the other hand, Halek and Eisenhaur (2001) finds that entrepreneurs do not differ 
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from wage earners and further, are more risk-averse than others in some cases. In a 
closely related empirical work, Wu and Knott (2006) study the entrepreneur’s decision of 
market entry combined with two distinct sources of uncertainty: demand uncertainty and 
uncertainty regarding entrepreneur’s own ability. They argue that entrepreneurs are risk 
averse with respect to demand uncertainty and risk seeking with respect to performance 
uncertainty. Recently, Corbett and Fransoo (2008) also empirically investigate whether 
entrepreneurs follow the newsvendor logic and how their risk preferences affect their 
inventory decisions. We contribute to this stream of literature by explicitly modeling for 
operating decisions and bankruptcy which derives the risk preferences of the firm 
together with the investment opportunities, in a framework sequentially introducing 
technology, competition and demand risks. 
In sum, the effect of cost reducing R&D on the profitability of firms has been 
studied extensively for established firms that are unencumbered by bankruptcy concerns. 
Further, cost reduction strategies adopted after the launch of a breakthrough product to 
maximize the profits is a relevant problem for many startup firms that take on debt and 
face the cash flow related threat of survival. However, this problem has not been explored 
formally. In the rest of this chapter, we set up and study a startup’s production and cost 
reducing investment decisions. 
3.3. THE BASE CASE 
When making production and investment decisions, there are three key factors a 
typical startup considers: customer demand, startup’s technological performance and 
competitive pressures (Shane 2007). To understand the interrelated impact of these 
factors on the operating decisions, we consider a two period model of a startup firm 
offering a single new product. This firm is financed by debt and must generate pre-
specified level of profit after the first period to ensure survival into the second period. 
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The objective of the firm is to maximize the total of two-period profits under the survival 
requirement. In this section we focus on a base case (BC) model with no demand 
uncertainty, and study the impact of technological performance and competitive pressures 
on the startup’s operating decisions. In Section 3.3.1, we start with a simple model which 
serves as a benchmark for our analysis. Then we sequentially introduce uncertainty 
associated with the firm’s process investment and second period competition in Section 
3.3.2 and Section 3.3.3, respectively. For generality, we use the terms “return on process 
investment” and “technological performance” interchangeably throughout this 
manuscript. 
3.3.1. A Benchmark Model  
We start with some key assumptions to set up our model.  
Assumption 3.1. Product R&D is frozen at the beginning of the first period, i.e. at 
market entry. 
At least half of the startup firms in the US enter the market with a novel product 
(GEM Report 2007), and many of these firms continue to invest into product 
development effort. We do not allow for such investments, so that our analysis is not 
confounded by the evolution of product quality. 
 Assumption 3.2. The startup is financed by bank loans with a constant positive interest 
rate.  
We consider a bank-financed startup, but our models and results trivially extend 
to bootstrapped startups. The interest rate is constant and positive, and upon fully paying 
its previous debt the startup can borrow in each period to cover its production cost and 
R&D investment. In general, once the loan is granted to a small firm, the loan terms 
including interest rate and loan limit are determined by industry practices and market 
conditions and do not depend on the conditions of the borrower firm (Petersen and Rajan 
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1994). For ease of exposure, we consider the effect of an explicit loan limit as an 
extension in Section 3.6. There is no time discount on the profits of the second period. 
The analysis is unchanged, if we consider a discount parameter between periods.  
Assumption 3.3. The startup goes bankrupt and gets liquidated if it cannot pay its debt 
at the end of each period.  
Most startups have limited access to capital markets and cannot raise additional 
capital other than their initial funds (Chrisman et al. 1998). In particular, informational 
asymmetries between the owners of the startups and the investors, and the uncertainties 
about the future prospects of the startup severely limit the firm’s access to capital markets 
(Shane 2007). Hence, most new businesses are built with limited capital and face 
immediate bankruptcy in case of a default.  
Based on these assumptions, the timing of the game is as follows. In the first 
period, the startup firm is a monopoly operating with a unit production cost of 1c  and 
receives funds, 1y , with an interest rate of r. It allocates these funds at the beginning of 
the first period between production capacity, 1q , and process R&D investment, A, which 
will in return linearly reduce the unit production cost in the second period to 
( )2 1,c A c Aβ β= − , where β denotes the return on investment (Gupta and Loulou 1998). At 
the beginning of the consecutive period, the startup realizes revenues from sales, observes 
reduction in unit cost due to process investment, and makes the debt payments. In case, 
the revenues are not sufficient to cover the debt obligations, the firm goes bankrupt and 
gets liquidated. If the debt is paid in full then the firm goes into the second period and 
could receive a second round of funding, 2y  to invest in production, as this is the final 
period. We adopt a linear inverse demand function for the startup’s product as 
( )t t tp q qθ= − , t=1, 2, where θ  denotes the constant market size. We offer the following 
as the benchmark model:  
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1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2( ( ) ) ( ; , ), , 0
max p q c q ry A q A
q A y
π π β= − − − +≥
subject to  1 1 1c q A y+ ≤ (3.1a) 
1 1 1 1 1( ( ) ) 0p q c q ry A− − − ≥ (3.1b) 
where 
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ; , ) ( ( ) ( , )), 0
q A max p q c A q ry
q y
π β β= − −≥
subject to 2 2 2c q y≤ (3.1c) 
In this model, (3.1a) and (3.1c) represent the financial constraints in the first and 
second periods, respectively, such that the total expenditures of the firm in each period 
are limited by the amount of money borrowed. (3.1b) denotes the survival constraint 
requiring that the money borrowed in the first period should be paid back with interest at 
the end of the period. Based on our model assumptions, (3.1a) and (3.1c) must be 
binding. Therefore, we re-state (3.1) as follows: 
1
1 1 1 1 1 2 2
, 0
( ( ) (1 ) ) (1 ) ( ; , )
q A
max p q r c q r A q Aπ π β
≥
= − + − + +
     subject to  1 1 1 1( ( ) (1 ) ) (1 ) 0p q r c q r A− + − + ≥
     where 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2( ; , ) ( ( ) (1 ) ( , ))0
q A max p q r c A q
q
π β β= − +≥  
(3.2)
Assuming that the return on investment β  is constant and equal to μ ,  we 
characterize the operating decisions and profits in Proposition 3.3.1. We use the 
superscript bc to denote the benchmark case. Later we will use c for the case with 
competition and t for the case with uncertain return on investment. (See the Appendix for 
proofs of the lemmas, propositions and corollaries unless stated otherwise.) 
Proposition 3.3.1: When demand and the return on investment are deterministic, the 
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zero, the optimal process investment for the startup, *A , and the optimal expected profits, 
*π , are given by the following: 
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where 2 2( (1 ) ) 8 ( (1 ) ) 16bc r c r cμ θ μ θΔ = − + + − + − .  
A close examination of (3.2) reveals that the startup’s optimization problem is 
partially separable in production quantity and process investment. Consequently, we find 
in Proposition 3.3.1 that it is optimal to produce the monopoly quantity, and the 
monopoly profits limit the investment amount due to the survival constraint. 
To explain the investment decision, we define the firm’s propensity to invest in 
process improvement as Δ . In particular, if 0Δ < , then the firm does not invest in 
process improvement. Therefore, the profits in each period are identical and equal to the 
monopoly profits. However, if the firm’s propensity to invest is sufficiently high, 0Δ ≥ , 
then it would allocate all of its funds in process improvement and make zero net profits 
after the debt payments, in the first period. It could later generate enough revenues with 
the second period sales to compensate for the missed earnings of the first period. In 
particular, the firm either chooses not to invest, A* = 0, or if it chooses to invest, it invests 
the maximum possible amount, Amax, which would maximize its profits without going 
bankrupt. Therefore, the optimal process investment decision can be characterized by an 
invest-all-or-nothing threshold policy. Further, as the mean return on investment and 
market size increase, the firm’s propensity to invest also increases. 
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3.3.2. Technology Uncertainty  
So far, we have assumed that process investment reduces the future unit cost of 
the firm by a deterministic amount. Nevertheless, for startups with niche processes like 
Faradox and BigFoot Networks return on process investment is inherently uncertain. To 
take this into consideration, we extend our discussion in the benchmark case to consider 
the impact of the return on investment uncertainty on the startup’s operating decisions 
and profits. In particular, for every dollar invested, we assume that the second period cost 
is reduced by a random amount described by β? , with a known distribution function, 
( )ψ β? , with a mean of μ and a variance of σ2. The following proposition characterizes the 
optimal production and investment decisions in the benchmark model with technology 
uncertainty.  
Proposition 3.3.2: When demand is deterministic, but the return on investment is 
uncertain, then the startup’s optimal production quantity is equal to the monopoly 
quantity. And, the optimal process investment and profits are, respectively, given by 
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where 2 2 2( )( (1 ) ) 8( (1 ) ) 16tu r c r cσ μ θ θ μΔ = + − + + − + − . 
With return on investment uncertainty the firm’s propensity to invest becomes 
larger than the case with no uncertainty in return on investment, i.e., 
2 2( (1 ) )tu bc r cθ σΔ = Δ + − + . Further, the firm profits are also non-decreasing in σ2, so 
when selecting among production technologies, the startup prefers technologies with 
more variable return compared to the ones with relatively certain returns. This may seem 
like a counterintuitive result, but if this technology adoption proves to be successful, then 
the firm could obtain significant cost reduction and have a major increase in profits. That 
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is, the startup disproportionately benefits from upside deviation in return on process 
investment. In our model, this is driven by the convex monopoly profits, 
2( (1 ) ) / 4r cθ − + , with respect to the unit cost in the second period.  
3.3.3. Competition 
In this section, we study the case with competition. The sequence of events is 
precisely the same as the case without competition. The difference is that at the beginning 
of the second period a competitor with an identical product enters the market and firms 
play a Cournot game where the competitor’s best response quantity is denoted by cq . 
The updated sequence of events and the startup’s decisions are summarized in Figure 3.1. 
t = 1
Period 1 Period 2
Startup holds a 
monopoly position.
Start-up decides how much :
(1) money to borrow (y1),
(2) produce (q1) and
(3) investment in process 
improvement (A1), in period one.
Startup (if survives) pays back the
borrowed money and decides how much
(1) money to borrow (y2) and
(2) produce (q2), in period two.
(1) Startup realizes cost reduction due to 
process investment.
(2) Rival firm enters the market and firms 
engage in a quantity competition.
Figure 3.1: Sequence of Events and Decisions in a Two Period Model with Competition 
When a competitor is to enter the market, the startup may not fully know the 
entrant’s production system for a new product, but it may know the competitor’s cost 
through a probability distribution function. Indeed, Faradox Inc., a producer of high 
energy-density capacitors, mentioned in our interview that there was tremendous amount 
of theoretical research in the field of capacitor technologies and it was likely that 
someone might enter their market by developing a new process to produce high energy-
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density capacitors. Hence, from the perspective of Faradox, the efficiency of the 
prospective competitor in the future is highly uncertain and exogenous.   
To incorporate this into our benchmark model, we assume that the unit variable 
cost of the competitor, ξ~ , is distributed with a probability density function of ( )φ ξ? , and 
has a mean of λ and a variance of τ2. For ease of exposure, we exclude technology 
uncertainty in this section, but our findings here also trivially extend to the case with both 
technology uncertainty and competition. The following proposition characterizes the 
startup’s optimal production and investment decisions for the benchmark model with 
competition.  
Proposition 3.3.3: Under deterministic demand and return on investment, when there is 
competition in the future period, then the startup’s optimal production quantity is equal 
to the monopoly quantity. The optimal process investment and the optimal profits are, 
respectively, given by 
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, 
where 2( ( (1 ) ) 2) 4 ((1 ) ) 13c r c r cμ θ μ λΔ = − + + − + − − . 
From Proposition 3.3.3, we observe that the propensity of the startup to invest 
increases with the expected unit cost of the competitor, i.e., / 0c λ∂Δ ∂ > . In other words, 
when faced with a strong competitor, the startup is less willing to invest since the benefits 
of investment is reduced under competition. According to our investment policy, the 
variance of the competitor’s cost would have no effect on the investment decision so long 
as the quantity response function is linear in the realization of competitor’s cost. 
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However, since Cournot profits are convex in the competitor’s cost, the optimal profits 
increase as the strength of competition gets more variable because the startup 
disproportionately benefits from high cost entrants.  
Comparing the firm’s propensity to invest with and without competition for 
various levels of competitor’s unit cost, we can further explain the impact of the strength 
of future competition on the firm’s propensity to invest:  
Corollary 3.3.1: In the presence of competition the startup’s propensity to invest 
increases compared to the benchmark case, if the expected competitor is relatively weak. 
In particular:  
i) 7 / 4bc c if θλ μ−Δ ≥ Δ ≤ , 
ii) 7 / 4bc c if θλ μ−Δ ≤ Δ ≥ . 
Corollary 3.3.1 shows that the firm may find it optimal to invest in the presence of 
competition when it is better off with no investment in the benchmark case, i.e., 
0bc cΔ < < Δ . Therefore, the shadow of future competition may encourage investment by 
the startup depending on the expected strength of the competitor.  
3.4. THE STOCHASTIC DEMAND AND SURVIVAL CASE 
In the BC, we studied the startup firm’s operating decisions under deterministic 
demand. However, in most cases the startup would have very limited information about 
the demand, especially for a brand new product. In this section, we examine our model 
with stochastic demand in each period, and replace the deterministic survival constraint 
of the BC with a probabilistic survival requirement.  
3.4.1. The Model with Stochastic Demand and Survival 
In this case, we assume a demand shock, tε? , in each period t (t = 1, 2) with a 
normal probability density function, (.)ϕ , with mean zero and variance v2, and 
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cumulative distribution function, (.)ϑ . The minimum profit level required for the survival 
denoted by π  is exogenous and includes the overhead costs like rents and wages. We 
define the first period net expected monopoly profits, mπ π− , as the immediate 
economical viability of the firm (Note that the expected monopoly profits is given by 
1[( ( , ) (1 ) ) ]m m mE p q r c qπ ε= − +? ). Under the SDSC case with competition, technology 
uncertainty and stochastic demand, the two-period expected profit maximization problem 
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where I is the first period survival indicator (= 1 if the firm survives the first 
period) and M is a large number. In (3.3), the constraints in the second stage of the 
problem only hold if the startup has survived the first period. In particular, unless the first 
period profit for the startup meets the minimum level required for survival ( )1π π< , the 
startup cannot play the second period quantity game. In this case, the survival indicator 
variable I in (3.3) has to be zero and consequently, 2q  is also forced to zero. 
We solve the optimization problem in (3.3) by backward induction. In the second 
period, firms play a Cournot game to maximize their expected profits. Hence, the 
startup’s equilibrium profit, if it could play the second period game, is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )22 1 2 2; , , 2 1 , / 9A r c Aπ ε ξ β θ ε ξ β= + + − +  where 2 2( )E ε ε= . By assumption,
2 0ε = . For the startup to participate in the second period, first it has to survive in the first 
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period only if 1 1( )π ε π≥ . After substituting the optimal second period solution, the 
startup’s problem in (3.3) becomes  




1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1, ,, 0
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⎧ ⎫+ − += − − + − + ≥⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭? ?? ?
? ?? ?  (3.4)
Unlike the BC, the maximization problem is not separable in production and investment 
decisions, and it is non-convex. Nevertheless, we can still prove the following important 
relationship for the optimal decisions. 
Proposition 3.4.1: When demand is stochastic, the startup firm in the first period either 
adopts a conservative operating policy by producing and investing less than the 
monopoly levels i.e., (1 )
2m




π π−≤ = + , or an aggressive operating 





π π−≥ = + . 
Proposition 3.4.1 provides an interesting risk based justification linking 
production and investment decisions of a startup under stochastic demand and bankruptcy 
risk. The firm is aggressive in investment decision ( )mA A≥ , if and only if it is also 
aggressive in production ( )mq q∗ ≥ . Or, the firm is conservative in investment decision 
( )mA A<  if and only if it is also conservative in production ( )mq q∗ < . If an aggressive 
investment is planned, then the expected cash flows under the monopoly production plan 
is not sufficient to cover the debt payments. Hence, the firm increases its production 
quantity above the monopoly level so as to benefit from upside demand realizations and 
to increase its survival chances and conversely, a conservative investment reduces 
production below the monopoly level. 
In the following proposition, we establish the intimate connection between the 
optimal operating policy of the firm and the survival probability. 
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, is less (more) than fifty 
percent. 
Proposition 3.4.2 provides an equivalent survival-based definition for optimal 
aggressive and conservative operating decisions. That is, optimal operating policies that 
survive less (more) than 50% chances always involve producing and investing more 
(less) than the monopoly levels, and vice versa. This implies that an aggressive firm is 
expected to go bankrupt on average while a conservative firm is expected to survive. In 
general, an operating policy is considered to be riskier as the survival probability 
decreases.  
In the reminder of this section and in Section 3.5, we explore the factors that that 
drive the optimal operating decisions of the startup under stochastic demand. In 
Proposition 3.4.1 we implicitly assume that the startup would find an investment 
opportunity. However, that may not be the case. Corollary 3.4.1 considers the impact of 
the existence of investment opportunities (with positive NPV) on the operating decision 
of economically viable startup firms. Recall that immediate economical viability means 
the firm’s first period net expected monopoly profits are non-negative. 
Corollary 3.4.1: Suppose the startup firm is immediately economically viable in the first 
period, i.e., 0mπ π− > . Then, 
i) if there are no process investment opportunities, 0A = , the firm always adopts a
conservative operating policy. That is, the firm produces less than the monopoly quantity.   
ii) if there is an opportunity for process investment, 0A ≥ , then the startup may either
adopt an aggressive or conservative operating policy.  
According to Corollary 3.4.1, when there are no investment opportunities, 
immediately economically viable startups always choose a conservative operating policy. 
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To better illustrate our finding, we examine a simple situation with no minimum level of 
profits, π  = 0 and we let the demand shocks in each period ( tε  for t =1, 2) be uniformly 
distributed with U[-b, +b]. Then, the optimization problem takes the following form: 
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2 2 2 2 2 2
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When there are no investment opportunities (A = 0), ( ,0)f q  is concave in q and 
the optimal quantity is given by 
2
* (1 ) 1 ( 2(1 ) )
2 4 9 m
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θ θ λ− + + − += − <⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , which 
agrees with our finding that in the absence of investment opportunities, the firm always 
behaves conservatively. The positive second term of the optimal quantity, *q , above 
represents the under-production amount due to stochastic bankruptcy risk in order to 
increase the probability of survival. In particular, if the bankruptcy risk is to be removed 
from the decision framework, the firm simply produces the first best production level, 
i.e., the monopoly quantity. That is, the bankruptcy risk drives an economically viable 
startup to adopt a conservative policy in the absence of investment opportunities. In 
addition, startups with high expected future prospects, such as a large market base, an 
already efficient process technology or a relatively weak competitor, focus more on 
survival in anticipation of future profits. That is, they deviate more from their first best 
operating plans and choose a more conservative policy.  
We will numerically investigate the optimal operating policies for this case in 
Section 3.5. We now turn our attention to a firm that is not economically viable in the 
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first period. We implicitly assume that the firm is economically viable over the planning 
horizon. Otherwise, it is optimal to liquidate the firm at time zero. 
Corollary 3.4.2: Suppose the startup firm is not immediately economically viable in the 
first period, i.e., 0mπ π− ≤ , then the firm always adopts an aggressive operating policy, 
regardless of the existence of investment opportunities.  
When the firm is not immediately viable, e.g., due to high operating costs relative 
to immediate profits, its survival is contingent on the upside deviations in market 
demand. To benefit from these upside deviations and survive, the firm should increase its 
production above the monopoly quantity. Consequently, even with no investment 
opportunities the firm would always choose an aggressive operating policy. We 
summarize the effects of the immediate economical viability and investment 
opportunities on the operating policy of the startup in Table 3.1. 
Our results show that an immediately viable startup with investment opportunities 
may either adopt a conservative or an aggressive operating policy depending on the 
market parameters. To further investigate this case and the impact of market parameters 
on the optimal operating decisions, we present a comprehensive computational analysis 
in the next section. We also note that this case is not analytically tractable. There are 
several reasons for this, including that the objective function in (3.4) is neither jointly 
convex nor concave in 1q and A  for all feasible set of parameter settings. 
Immediately Viable Startup 
( 0mπ π− > ) 
Immediately Non-viable 
Startup ( 0mπ π− > ) 
With Investment 
Opportunities 
Conservative or aggressive 
operating policy depending  on 
market parameters 
Aggressive operating policy 
With No Investment 
Opportunities Conservative operating policy Aggressive operating policy 
Table 3.1: Operating Policy of the Startup 
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3.4.2. Computational Analysis 
In this section, we focus on a set of numerical analyses to illustrate the impact of 
key market factors (demand uncertainty, technological performance, competition and 
minimum required level of profits), on the optimal operating policies (production and 
process investment) of the immediately viable startups with investment opportunities. We 
also provide insights that link the BC to SDSC.  
3.4.2.1. Design of Numerical Experiments 
Our design of experiment focuses on the optimal survival probability as the 
relevant measure of the risk taken by the firm. The survival probability is an endogenous 
variable determined by the firm’s production and investment policy. Recall that a 
conservative policy survives with probability more than 50% while an aggressive strategy 
bankrupts with probability more than 50%. And, a conservative (aggressive) policy 
involves producing less (more) than the monopoly quantity and investing less (more) than 
the expected net monopoly profits.  
We begin with examining the impact of mean return on investment in Section 
3.4.2.2 in an experimental setup that has no competition, deterministic return on 
investment and zero interest rate as in BC. In this case the optimization problem in (3.4) 
reduces to  
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Following, we explore the impact of technological uncertainty and competition on 
the operating decisions in Section 3.4.2.3 and 3.4.2.4, respectively. For ease of 
exposition, throughout our numerical analysis we fix the market size and initial unit cost 
(θ = 10, c = 7), so mq = 1.5 and mπ = 2.25. The standard deviation of demand shock is set 
to v = 1.2. The impact of different levels of v is investigated in Section 3.4.2.5. We 
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present a selective set of our results, but we have tested and confirmed similar results 
with entire sets of values that the model parameters can take.
3.4.2.2. Benchmark Case with Stochastic Demand 
In this section we examine the impact of mean return on investment, μ, and the 
immediate economical viability of the firm through minimum required profits, π . Figure 
3.2 illustrates the optimal operating decisions and the associated survival probabilities for 
all reasonable levels of  μ. We observe in Figure 3.2 that it is optimal to invest if 
μ > 0.9. Τhen, as in the BC, a threshold type of investment policy is optimal, but the 
policy does not have an invest-all-or-nothing structure. As the firm’s potential efficiency 
in cost reduction  increases, the firm raises its investment amount in process technology 
leading to riskier operating decisions with lower survival probability. Indeed, aggressive 
investment becomes the optimal policy for μ > 2.3. In addition, the production quantity 
may either increase or decrease with the investment level to create an operational hedge 
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Figure 3.2: Optimal Operating Decisions and Survival Probability as a Function of 
































































Figure 3.3 illustrates the interactive impact of μ and π  on the optimal policy. We 
observe that ‘no investment’ region expands as π  increases. In particular, when π  is 
high, investment creates a very high bankruptcy risk consuming the limited short-term 
profits of the firm. Therefore, the firm avoids investment. On the hand, if π  is low, then 
the firm is expected to have cash in the future and, it may invest some of this cash in 
process improvement without diminishing its survival probability. Further, depending on 
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Figure 3.3: Interaction of μ and π  under SDSC Case 
4.4.2.3. Technology Uncertainty 
In the previous section we discuss the impact of mean return on investment on the 
operating decisions of the firm, but we did not examine the associated uncertainty. We 
complete this discussion by illustrating the effect of technology uncertainty, σ, in Figure 
3.4. For ease of discussion, in the reminder of this section we set 0π = , but similar 
No Investment
( * *0, , 0.5mA q q P= ≤ ≥ ) 
Aggressive Policy 
( * *, , 0.5m mA A q q P≥ ≥ ≤ ) 
Conservative Policy













   
No Investment
( * *0, , 0.5mA q q P= ≥ ≤ ) 
2.25 
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results can be obtained for other values. Under deterministic demand, from Proposition 
3.3.2, we know that as the return on investment gets more variable and the chances of 
upside deviations increase, the firm is more willing to invest. Similarly, when demand is 
uncertain, Figure 3.4 leads to the observation that for a given level of μ, an increase in 
technology uncertainty decreases the survival chances of the firm, by inducing more 
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Figure 3.4: Optimal Production Quantity and Process Investment as a Function of 
σ (μ = 1.5) 
3.4.2.4. Competition 
In this section we explore the impact of competition on the operating decision of 
the firm under stochastic demand and deterministic return on investment. In Figure 3.5 
we present the optimal operating decisions as well as the associated survival probabilities 
as the competitor’s expected cost λ changes for a given level of return on investment μ.  
 

































































Figure 3.5: Optimal operating decisions and survival probability as a function of λ       
(μ = 1.5). 
Similar to the BC, Figure 3.5 shows that the firm starts investing when the 
competitor is sufficiently weak and benefits from investment in the future period. 
However, the firm may invest (and produce) either aggressively or conservatively 
depending on the level of λ. Further, for a given level of μ it does not necessarily keep 
raising its investment amount as the competition gets weaker because although the 
expected marginal second period profit of the firm is increasing with λ, a higher 
investment amount also increases firm’s exposure to bankruptcy. Figure 3.5 illustrates 
this tradeoff that firm chooses a conservative investment policy when faced with very 
weak competitors to control the bankruptcy risk.  
Figure 3.6 further explores the interrelated impact of competition and the mean 
return on process improvement on the optimal operating policy of the firm. The startup 
makes no process investment if it is not efficient to engage in competition with a 
relatively strong competitor.  A conservative policy is chosen when the future entrant 
would not intensify competition because it has relatively high cost production process. 
Further, an aggressive policy is adopted when the startup is sufficiently efficient in cost 








































































period profits are distributed more equally between the firms. Hence, by following an 
aggressive strategy (if it is not too costly) the startup may significantly increase its share 
of expected profits in the second period and obtain a strong future market position.  









Mean Return on Investment (μ) 
Figure 3.6: Interaction of μ -λ under SDSC Case 
3.4.2.5. Demand Uncertainty 
Demand uncertainty is an exogenous factor influencing the bankruptcy risk. 
Recall that with demand uncertainty investment amount may be either less or more than 
monopoly investments. Figure 3.7 illustrates that demand uncertainty shrinks investment 
regions when it is optimal to start investing in process R&D, and the thresholds for 
process investment in the SDSC are higher than the BC, ceteris paribus. 
No Investment
( * *0, , 0.5mA q q P= ≤ ≥ ) 
Aggressive Policy 
( * *, , 0.5m mA A q q P≥ ≥ ≤ ) 
Conservative Policy

























Figure 3.7: Partitioning of the Process Investment Space under the BC and SDSC 
Figure 3.8 shows the impact of demand variability and mean return on investment 
on the optimal policy when there is no competition and technological variability. As 
shown in Figure 3.8, when v is very low, the startup either chooses not to invest or invests 
conservatively. A higher variability of demand provides the firm with the opportunity of 
survival under aggressive investment plans. Hence, aggressive policies are only possible 
if demand is sufficiently variable to provide high demand and the firm is efficient in cost 
reduction. Indeed, when demand is deterministic as in the BC, aggressive policies are 
infeasible. These observations combined with our earlier findings support that demand 
variability is necessary to induce immediately viable firms to increase their investment 
amount and adopt aggressive policies if the increased second period profits due to 
aggressive investment compensate the excess risk taken by the firm. Also note that Figure 
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Figure 3.8: Interaction of μ−ν under SDSC Case 
3.5. EXTENSION: DEBT CAPACITY 
To isolate the impact of bankruptcy risk, we have assumed throughout the chapter 
that the startup firm is able to borrow enough to finance its optimal operating policy in 
the first period. In this section we introduce a debt capacity, L, which limits the total cash 
available to the firm ( cq A L+ ≤ ), and examine its effect on the risk preferences of the 
startup. In Proposition 3.5.1 we characterize the impact of debt capacity on the base case 
results under deterministic demand. 
Proposition 3.5.1: Under deterministic demand and return on investment, with no future 
competition,  
i) if maxmL cq A≥ + , the debt capacity is never binding. 
ii) if mL cq≤ , the debt capacity is always binding. 
iii) if maxm mcq L cq A< < + , the debt capacity may or may not be binding depending on 
the market parameters.  
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( * *, , 0.5m mA A q q P≥ ≥ ≤ ) 
Conservative Policy
( * *, , 0.5m mA A q q P≤ ≤ ≥ ) 
μ = 2.3 μ = 0.9 
ν = 1.2 
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If the debt capacity is larger than the maximum amount of cash that may be 
needed by the firm, i.e., maxmL cq A≥ + , additional cash has no value to the firm. In this 
case, the optimal operating decisions are characterized by Proposition 3.3.1 and the 
firm’s propensity to invest is unaffected. However, if debt capacity is not sufficient to 
finance the monopoly production level, the firm may invest additional capital into 
production and increase profits. Also, when the debt capacity is moderately tight 
( )maxm mcq L cq A< < + , the firm may benefit from additional cash if investment is 
optimal when there is no debt capacity. Further, in the following corollary we discuss the 
firm’s propensity to invest with a binding debt capacity. 
Corollary 3.5.2: Under deterministic demand, when there is a binding debt capacity, 
startup’s propensity to invest decreases. 
We show (Proposition 3.3.1) that the startup’s operating policy with no debt 
capacity can be described as an “all-or-nothing” policy, i.e., whether to invest nothing or 
to invest all of the net monopoly profits, maxA . However, under a binding debt capacity, 
the startup can never finance to invest as much as maxA . Besides, since the marginal return 
on investment is increasing in A, reducing the maximum investment level decreases the 
benefits of scale economies in investment and hence, decreases the firm’s propensity to 
invest. Figure 3.9 illustrates the firm’s propensity to invest lΔ  as a function of the debt 
capacity and compare it to bcΔ . Note that the firm invests if 0lΔ > . 
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Figure 3.9: The impact of debt capacity on the propensity to invest in the BC
(for θ =10, c =7) 
In Figure 3.9, the gap between solid and dashed lines denoted by u corresponds to 
the impact of debt capacity on the propensity to invest. For example, when there is no 
debt capacity, the startup optimally invests if μ > 0.55, but with a debt capacity of L = 4, 
the startup’s mean return on investment should be at least u + 0.55 = 0.76 to start 
investing. As the debt capacity increases, the investment gap decreases and becomes zero 
when the debt capacity is not binding (L > 12.75).    
Figure 3.10 presents the impact of debt capacity on the optimal operating policy 
of the startup under stochastic demand and survival. Note that Figure 3.10 is identical to 
Figure 3.6 for no debt capacity case. We observe that, our discussion in Section 3.4.2.4 
still holds, but the limiting effect of a tighter debt capacity is clear. Aggressive and 
conservative policy regions shrink and no-investment region expands with a tighter debt 
capacity.  
0, 0l bcΔ > Δ >  
0, 0l bcΔ < Δ <
u
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0bcΔ =  
0lΔ =  
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Figure 3.10: Impact of debt capacity on the operating policy in SDSC. 
Overall, our observations suggest that the firm’s propensity to invest is reduced 
with the debt capacity in the deterministic demand case, and the debt capacity makes the 
firm more conservative under stochastic demand. However, the basic results we have 
shown for the BC and SDSC remain valid under reasonably tight debt capacities.  
 3.6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Existing organizational theories (Bhide 2000) have marshaled evidence to argue 
that startup managers make myopic choices in their long term investment decisions when 
faced with uncertainty and financial pressure. Our analysis explores the impact of three 
key risk drivers (demand, technology and competition) on the short and long term 
production and process investment decisions of startups under the presence of explicit 
financial constraints. Since financial limitations alter optimal operating decisions; our 
results provide a risk based justification for startups linking their production with their 
process R&D investment. 
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3.6.1. Optimal Operating Decisions of Startups with Deterministic Demand 
Under deterministic demand we find that the startup always produces the 
monopoly quantity and uses a process investment threshold policy involving an “invest-
all-or-nothing” type of structure. The investment policy is described by the firm’s 
propensity to invest. We investigate the impact of demand, technological performance 
and competition on the firm’s propensity to invest in process improvement. In a large 
market the firm has high potential to recover the process investment. Similarly, higher 
expected return on investment (better expected technological performance) increases the 
potential benefits of investment and makes the firm more willing to invest. Further, as in 
new technology development, the firm disproportionately benefits more from upside 
deviations of return on investment. Hence, the firm’s propensity to invest increases as the 
process technological performance gets more variable.  
Impact of competition is more involved. As the expected competitor in the future 
gets stronger, it chips off future profits and the startup’s propensity to invest decreases. 
However, compared to the monopoly situation, the startup may invest to mitigate the 
impact of competition and secure its future earnings if the competitor is not very strong. 
We summarize the impact of key parameters on the optimal process investment of the 
startup under deterministic demand (base case) in Table 3.2. Recall that in BC the firm 
always produces the monopoly quantity. 
Factor Impact on Optimal Operating Policy 
Return on process investment The firm’s propensity to invest Δ  increases with mean (μ) and 
standard deviation (σ) of return on process technology investment. 
Competition Δ  decreases with expected level of competition (λ). 
Δ  increases compared to the monopoly case, if the competitor is not 
very strong.  
Debt Capacity Δ  decreases with debt capacity (L). 
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Table 3.2: Impact of Key Factors on the Optimal Operating Policy under Deterministic 
Demand 
3.6.2. Optimal Operating Decisions of Startups with Uncertain Demand 
In the deterministic base case the monopoly firm’s profitability is guaranteed after 
the first period. However, in the stochastic demand and survival case, demand may be too 
low and profitability is not assured. Therefore, the probabilistic survival constraint 
becomes critical. Recall from Section 3.2 that this constraint is a unique risk driver that 
has not been addressed in literature. It shapes our results as follows: while the decision to 
invest in process development at early stages reduces the startup’s profits and increases 
its exposure to bankruptcy, the low cost production process in subsequent periods could 
improve the startup’s competitiveness and its market position. Hence, our core result 
states that under stochastic demand a central consideration in the startup’s decision on the 
investment allocation is the tradeoff between the long-term expected profits and short-
term bankruptcy risk. 
When there is no demand risk, the firm always produces the monopoly level and 
invests nothing or all of the monopoly profits, as shown in the base case. When faced 
with stochastic bankruptcy risk, the startup sacrifices some short-term profits by 
deviating from its first best production plan. In the conservative case, the firm under-
produces so as to allocate more cash to process R&D while controlling the survival 
chances. Further, depending upon competitor’s cost, technological performance and 
aggregate demand, the startup may also invest aggressively by increasing the investment 
level above the BC level. In this case, the startup over-produces (more than the monopoly 
quantity) to cover the higher bankruptcy risk due to the aggressive process investment. 
That is, from an operational perspective, the startup hedges aggressive investment 
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decisions by producing aggressively while conservative investment decisions involve 
conservative production plans. 
Further, we identify two factors influencing operating decisions of startups: (1) 
the existence of positive NPV investment opportunities and (2) the immediate 
economical viability of the firm. We have shown that the startups that are not 
immediately economically viable adopt aggressive business plans, while immediately 
economically viable startups with no investment plans would always be conservative. 
Under stochastic demand, an intriguing case for decision making is revealed when there 
exists investment opportunities, and the firm is immediately economically viable. In this 
case, we numerically investigate the startup’s optimal operating decisions and find that 
depending on demand uncertainty, success in process development, and anticipated 
competition, the firm could either follow an aggressive or conservative investment 
strategy. Our analysis indicates that the startup becomes aggressive and adopts riskier 
operating plans with lower survival chances when its efficiency of cost reduction 
increases or when faced with moderately strong competitors. Our results also demonstrate 
that demand uncertainty drives aggressive behavior. Since the survival of aggressive 
policies is dependent on the upside realizations in demand, highly variable markets create 
an incentive to follow aggressive policies. These results are summarized in Table 3.3. 
Factor Impact on Optimal Operating Policy 
Return on process 
investment 
No investment for low returns 
Conservative operating policy with moderate returns  




No Investment for low levels of immediate economical viability, mπ π− .
Conservative operating policy for high levels of mπ π−   
Aggressive operating policy for moderate levels of, mπ π−   
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Competition No Investment with strong competitors 
Conservative operating policy with weak competitors 
Aggressive operating policy with moderately strong competitors 
Demand Aggressive operating policy with higher demand variability 
Debt capacity Conservative operating policy with tighter debt capacity  
Table 3.3: Impact of Key Factors on the Optimal Operating Policy under Stochastic 
Demand 
We discussed our results with startup managers in search of process improvement 
opportunities in order to seek feedback about the model outcomes. In general, there 
seems to be an agreement among our respondents about the risky nature of process 
investment and the operational levers for hedging these risks. Some managers also 
pointed to additional factors that come into play into such decisions. For instance, the 
managers at Bigfoot Networks indicated that they currently outsourced semiconductor 
manufacturing and was looking for in-sourcing options, because it might provide 
opportunities for cost reduction. Faradox decided to use an emerging technology fund 
from Central Texas Regional Center of Innovation and Commercialization to develop a 
new fabrication process because production process has become a key part of their long-
term business model. Below, we discuss the limitations of our model and potential 
extensions that have come up as a result of such field work.  
3.6.3. Limitations and Extensions 
We have studied process improvement which reduces the future unit cost. 
However, it would be interesting to study other forms of strategic investment, such as 
quality enhancing R&D, marketing and advertisement, which may also improve the 
future prospects of the firm. Further, our models and results trivially extend to 
bootstrapped startups. This extension is particularly important because a significant 
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portion of the new firms are financed by bootstrapping (Bhide 2000). We also do not 
consider venture capital funded startups which may be an interesting future research 
direction. And, startups in our model do not consider exit strategies, e.g., mergers or 
acquisition choices, which are also central to process investment decision. It would be 
useful to explore how investment in process development change without financially 
risking the startup’s survival when the startup’s objective is to signal a potentially strong 
market presence in order to look more attractive for a takeover. This could alter the 
startup’s decisions and yield different results. And finally, it ought to be possible to test 
the application frameworks in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 empirically. Investigating these issues 
will enhance our understanding of a startup’s decision making with regards to product 
and process R&D management strategies.
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Chapter 4 
An Integrated Approach to Commodity Risk Management 
4.1.   INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 Maximizing firm value, defined as the total properly discounted value of 
expected cash flows, is a central concern for the managers of publicly traded companies. 
In this chapter, we provide a model that links the financial risk management and the 
operational decisions of a value maximizing firm, under the presence of capital market 
imperfections. An overarching implication of our analysis is that publicly traded firms 
may significantly increase their market value, and generate more wealth for their 
shareholders by effectively integrating their financial risk management and production 
decisions.  
 Our research is motivated by the flour milling industry. Milling is the process of 
grinding and sifting wheat into flour which is a principal ingredient in the manufacture 
and production of bakery goods. Other major uses of flour include pasta, and blended and 
prepared flour packages (Harwood et al. 1989). The milling process also produces animal 
feed as a by-product. 
 A typical flour miller buys wheat from the market, either directly or through a 
third party commodity trading firm such as Cargill or ADM among others, and converts it 
into flour which is sold to the bakers. Historically, as milling is a weight losing activity, 
mills were located near wheat growing areas to save on the costs of transportation 
(Barber and Titus 1995). However, over the last two decades, increases in the efficiency 
in storage and transportation activities together with an enhanced business emphasis on 
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responsiveness to demand fluctuations, has led mills to migrate near the consumption 
areas. 
 In our motivating example, it takes around two weeks for the miller to receive a 
wheat order. Once the wheat is received, it takes one to two days to convert it into flour 
and deliver it to the customer. To effectively meet the demand, millers usually carry 
inventory of wheat and convert it into flour when they receive a firm customer order. 
Indeed, the flour market is very competitive due to low product differentiation, and 
unmet demand is quickly satisfied by competitors.  
 On the other hand, long delivery lead times together with highly volatile wheat 
prices create a significant risk of holding inventory. For example, in late April 2009 
wheat futures for July 09 delivery was trading around 520 cents per bushel (CPB). 
However, by the end of May 2009 prices quickly soared up to 670 CPB while during the 
following two weeks prices plummet down to 580 CPB (Figure 4.1 below shows the 
change in wheat prices during the first half of 2009). Hence, the millers carrying 
inventory during this period, experienced a sharp increase and then a decrease in the 
value of wheat they have in their silos. 
Figure 4.1: Wheat Futures Prices for July 2009 Delivery 
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The sales price of flour is highly correlated with the wheat prices, and the changes 
in wheat prices are quickly reflected to flour prices. Hence, fluctuations in wheat prices 
not only impact the input costs but also affect the revenues of the miller. Table 4.1 below 
shows the relationship between wheat and flour prices between 2004 and 2009. As it is 
suggested by the table, millers operate with very thin profit margins (an average of 3-4%) 
and, from a financial perspective, chances in wheat prices may easily cause the millers to 
drain their cash reserves or default on their debt obligations. Table 4.1 also shows that 
despite the fluctuations in the wheat and flour prices, the profit margin of the milling 
business remains roughly the same.   
Table 4.1: Wheat and Flour Prices from 2004 to 2009 (USDA 2009) 
When established firms run out of cash or default (either due to price or demand 
fluctuations), then usually they do not immediately go bankrupt or get liquidated, but 
they face financial distress. Indeed, flour millers typically have significant fixed 
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(tangible) assets and equipment which enable them to raise new capital and finance their 
operating plans. In our motivating case, millers may borrow from a bank line of credit, or 
as it is often the case, from an intermediary commodity trading firm, such as Cargill, who 
offers fast-response short-term financing in addition to delivering wheat from market to 
the millers. However, there is a cost premium for using this external financing; for 
example, Cargill charges double digit interest rates to the millers who operate on a 3-4% 
average profit margin. In the finance literature, the cost of external financing is 
recognized as a common form of financial distress cost (FDC).  
 In this research, we examine how financial risk management can be integrated 
with the operating decisions so as to control the firm's exposure to financial distress risk 
and to maximize the firm value. In Figure 4.2, we demonstrate the typical sequence of 
decisions and the allied cash flows for a flour miller. The firm orders wheat from the 
wheat market at the current spot price which is delivered by the commodity trading 
company at a pre-negotiated delivery cost. The firm (the miller) also locks in a set of 
wheat futures contracts to hedge the commodity price risk. When internally generated 
cash is exhausted, external financing is received at a premium cost. Finally, wheat is 
converted into flour and sold to the bakers.  
Figure 4.2: Summary of Operating and Financial Decisions of the Miller 
Now Then
1-Order for wheat 
2-Determine the financial 
hedging policy  
Receive and convert wheat into 
flour and sell to the bakers 
1- Receive revenues from operations 
2- Receive (possibly negative) cash flow 
from hedging transactions 
3- Realize cash outflows (fixed costs, cash 
transfers and dividend payments) 
4- Place new wheat orders 
5- Pay for external financing  
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Millers usually order wheat and produce flour in order to meet a set of 
deterministic customer orders as well as a set of future uncertain orders. In this research, 
we consider two business models for the operations of the firm. In the first case, the 
miller operates under fixed flour contracts in a Make-to-Order (MTO) business 
environment with deterministic demand. Second, we examine a case representing a 
Make-to-Stock (MTS) business plan with demand uncertainty. In practice, depending on 
their agreements with customers, and the lead time for wheat delivery, millers operate 
under a production system that has elements of both MTO and MTS environments. 
 Flour, which is mainly sold to the bakers, is a commodity-like product, i.e., 
product differentiation is minimal among different millers, but there is no explicit 
commodity market for it. Further, the flour market is very competitive and the pricing of 
flour strictly depends on the current wheat spot price. In particular, within a given 
geographical region, the competitive nature of the milling industry leads the millers to 
very quickly reach a single flour price by adding a standard margin (which includes a 
standard unit manufacturing cost and profit); in our model we assume this profit margin 
is an additive constant for all prices of wheat. For all practical purposes, both wheat and 
flour are non-perishable items and hence the leftover inventory can be easily carried over 
to the next production period, while the excess demand is lost.   
 As it is well known in the finance literature, in the absence of frictions, engaging 
in financial hedging is a neutral proposition. That is, it should not affect the optimal 
production plan, and it does not create value for firm's shareholders. However, when the 
firm faces capital market frictions, such as in our case costly financial distress, financial 
hedging can contribute to shareholder-value maximization. We show that, in the MTO 
case, it is optimal and possible to completely hedge for the price risk and totally eliminate 
the financial distress costs via taking an appropriate position in the futures market. On the 
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other hand, in the MTS case, the uncertainties associated with the future production plans 
limit the effectiveness of financial hedging decisions. In general, it is not possible to 
completely eliminate the financial distress risk, but appropriate financial hedging plans 
may significantly reduce it. We show that a coordinated financial hedging and operating 
plan contributes to shareholder-wealth creation (1) by reducing the firm's exposure to 
financial distress risk and mitigating the corresponding costs, and (2) by enabling the firm 
to operate at a higher level of output. 
 The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we provide a 
detailed review of the related literature in finance and operations management. Then in 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we provide a background on the evolution of stochastic commodity 
prices and discuss the dynamics of flour price and demand, respectively. Following, 
Section 4.5 details our mathematical model and Section 4.6 concludes with a summary of 
our results.  
4.2.   BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Since the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958), it is well known in the 
finance literature that, with perfect capital markets, financial risk management does not 
create any value. In particular, when there are no capital market frictions such as 
informational asymmetries, taxes and costs associated with transactions, bankruptcy and 
financial distress, hedging for financial risk does not add value to the firm since the 
shareholders can replicate any risk management activities implemented by the firm at the 
same cost. In the finance literature, financial risk management is explained through two 
major theories: (1) shareholder-value maximization, and (2) managerial motives and risk 
aversion (agency issues) (Jin and Jorion 2006).  
Financial hedging reduces the variability associated with the future cash flows of 
the firm. The value maximization theory argues that, fluctuations in future cash flows 
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involve certain costs, due to capital market imperfections, and firms may reduce these 
costs by financial hedging. Smith and Stulz (1985) claim that due to direct and indirect 
costs associated with financial distress, firm value is a concave function of future cash 
flows and hence financial hedging increases firm value. They also argue that convex tax 
schemes create a similar incentive to reduce the variability of the cash flows by financial 
hedging. On the other hand, Stulz (1990), Bessembinder (1991), and Froot et al. (1993) 
show that firms may also hedge to mitigate the problem of under-investment, when there 
is a cost premium for external financing.  
The second stream of the theory explains hedging through managerial motives 
derived from the managers' desire for maximizing their personal expected utility rather 
than maximizing wealth creation (i.e., rather than making decisions leading to Net 
Present Value (NPV) maximization). In particular, if the managers are risk averse, and 
their compensation is based on the end-of-period firm value, then the managers have a 
motivation to hedge (Stulz 1984, Smith and Stulz 1985).  
 In this chapter, financial risk management activities are motivated through the 
existence of financial distress costs. Direct and indirect costs of financial distress have 
been widely studied in the finance literature. Direct costs may include the legal costs of 
debt negotiations and cost of external financing while the indirect costs include lost sales, 
lost market share, and decreased credit ratings (see Purnanandam 2008 and Hotchkiss 
2008 for a recent review of the literature on the cost of financial distress). In our 
motivating example, as it is predicted by the pecking-order theory, flour millers first rely 
on internal cash to finance their operating expenses including the fixed and variable costs 
associated with procurement and production, as well as other cash outflows such as 
dividend payments and any other cash commitments considered in the firm's financial 
plan. If the internally generated cash is not sufficient to cover these cash outflows, then 
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the firm faces financial distress and incurs a cost proportional to the amount of the 
shortfall.  In particular, in our model we consider the cost premium of external financing 
which is a specific form of financial distress cost.  
 Unlike the finance literature dealing with costs of financial distress, in this 
research we model the specific linkages between the operating decisions and the costs of 
financial distress. Hence, our results provide an explicit relationship between operating 
and hedging policies and their implications for value creation. 
 On the other hand, the connection between operational and financial decisions 
has recently received attention in the operations management literature. Not surprisingly, 
the operations management literature also follows the two main streams of finance 
theories to explain the value of jointly considering financial and operational decisions. 
Papers including Gaur and Seshadri (2005), Ding et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2007) 
study the value of financial hedging from a risk-averse decision maker's perspective and 
consider the objective of maximizing expected utility.  
 A second stream of papers including Buzacott and Zhang (2004), Archibald et al. 
(2002), Swinney et al. (2005) and Babich and Sobel (2004) consider a firm with limited 
access to capital markets under the threat of bankruptcy (i.e., a small private firm). 
Hence, both of these research streams fall outside Miller-Modigliani framework.  
 Gaur and Seshadri (2005) address the problem of hedging inventory risk in a 
multi-period newsvendor environment when the demand is correlated with the price of a 
financial asset. Their objective is to maximize the expected utility of a risk-averse 
decision maker. Considering a wide range of utility functions and hedging strategies, they 
show that, a risk-averse decision maker orders more inventory when he or she hedges the 
inventory risk. Ding et al. (2007) consider the financial and operational hedging problems 
faced by a multi-national firm which has a production facility in one of the two markets it 
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sells to. The firm commits to capacity before the selling season and faces both demand 
and currency exchange rate risk. They consider a real option to partially hedge against the 
demand uncertainty, and use financial options on the currency exchange rate to hedge 
against the currency risk. The objective of the decision maker is to maximize the 
expected utility in a mean-variance utility framework. The authors derive the optimal 
capacity investment and financial hedging decisions, and investigate the impact of the 
operational hedging (capacity allocation option) and the financial hedging on the 
operating decisions of the firm. 
 As expected, the connection between finance and operations is most easily 
observed when managing start-up operations. Buzacott and Zhang (2004) establish the 
link between the financial capacity and the operating decisions of a retailer that has no 
fixed assets, via incorporating an asset-based financial constraint on the firm's debt 
capacity. Under deterministic demand, they provide a multi-period model to maximize 
profits where the retailer borrows from a bank to finance its operations. In a single period 
newsvendor environment, they also analyze a leader-follower game between the bank and 
the retailer. The retailer decides the production quantity and the loan amount while the 
bank decides the loan limit and the interest rate.  
Archibald et al. (2002) consider a multi-period inventory management problem 
for a startup firm with the objective of maximizing survival. The firm starts with an initial 
inventory and capital, and survives if its initial capital plus earnings are enough to cover 
the overhead cost in each period. No external funding is considered. Swinney et al. 
(2005) also consider a startup firm with the objective of maximizing survival probability 
in a single period model with competition. Financing cost is implicitly modeled as a part 
of the unit capacity cost, and the bankruptcy occurs if the profits at the end of the period 
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are less than an exogenous threshold (this threshold implicitly includes the interest 
payments).  
 Babich and Sobel (2004) study the coordination of operational decisions 
(production and sales) and financial decisions (loan size) to maximize the expected 
discounted proceeds from an initial public offering (IPO). Financial and operational 
decisions are linked to each other through a financial constraint which requires non-
negative profit in each period after the debt payments.  
 Consequently, in the operations management literature, the finance-operations 
interface is studied either in a utility maximization framework, or in a startup setting with 
bankruptcy risk. Hence, the findings of the literature do not necessarily extend to publicly 
traded firms who strive to maximize shareholder-value. Different from the above research 
streams, we study the finance-operations interface for a public corporation within the 
value framework of finance; hence our findings do not require any specific assumptions 
about the investors' utility functions.  Moreover, we contribute to the operations 
management research by examining the impact of the costs of financial distress on 
hedging and operating plans. 
4.3.   STOCHASTIC MODEL OF STORABLE COMMODITIES PRICES 
In this section, we briefly discuss the literature on evolution of spot and futures 
commodity prices, and explain the concept of marginal convenience yield. We denote ts
as the spot price of the commodity at time t , and we assume it will evolve stochastically 
through time as a function of only the information contained in the commodity price state 
space vector at time t , tP . Thus we assume the current spot price, ts , as well as the 
transition probabilities of the commodity price process from ts  to its value at time t t+ Δ ,   
denoted as t ts +Δ , can be obtained from the information contained in tP . To preclude risk-
free arbitrage opportunities, we define the time t  unit price of a futures contract for the 
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commodity with delivery date t t+ Δ , denoted as ,t t tf +Δ , using the risk-neutral valuation 
approach (Duffie 1992) as [ ], |=t t t P P t tt t tf E s+Δ +Δ+ΔQ  for any > 0tΔ . The superscript Q  and 
subscript tP   in the expectation operator indicate the expectation was calculated using the 
risk-neutral probability measure of the commodity price process, and this expectation is 
conditioned on the information in the state vector tP   observable at time t .   
The stochastic process governing the evaluation of spot price ts , and futures price 
,t t tf +Δ  are obtained as (deterministic) functions of tP  and tΔ . We denote the risk-neutral 
probability density and cumulative distribution functions for ts  as (.)t
Q
sφ  and (.)tQsΦ , 
respectively. We further assume the market trades enough financial instruments to 
replicate the evolution of tP  so that we can find a unique risk-neutral probability measure 
for the evolution of tP . 
 The difference between the current spot price, ts , and the futures price observed 
in the market for a commodity determine the economic cost of holding the commodity as 
inventory; in our model this difference is random, and it is also referred to as marginal 
convenience yield in the economics literature (Pindyck 2001). Specifically, the marginal 
convenience yield is the difference between the cost of buying and storing the commodity 
now, and the present value of the cost of buying it in the futures market for delivery next 
period, , 1,t t t ts h fβ β ++ −  and it is the economic cost of holding a unit in inventory. Notice 
that to exclude arbitrage opportunities we must have, at any time, a non-negative 
marginal convenience yield, i.e., , 1 0t t t ts h fβ β ++ − ≥ . Our models will be formulated in 
terms of primary, out-of-pocket costs such as ts , th , and , 1t tf + ; having a non-negative 
marginal convenience yield is an economic condition that, not surprisingly, arises as a 
part of the necessary conditions of optimality in our models.  
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4.4. WHEAT AND FLOUR PRICES AND THE DEMAND FOR FLOUR 
 Demand for flour is largely driven by the consumption of bread and other baked 
products. Bread consumption is affected by a number of economic, cultural and 
environmental factors. Anecdotal evidence indicates that weather has a large impact on 
short term, day to day, fluctuations in bread consumption; people are likely to increase 
their consumption of baked products during cold spells and are likely to decrease it 
during warm spells. Interestingly, even though wheat flour is the key ingredient in baked 
products, short term fluctuations of wheat prices do not have a significant effect on the 
consumption of baked products. 
 This phenomenon is reasonable as the cost of wheat is a very small fraction of the 
total price paid by the customer for the final product, and even if the price of wheat 
changes from one day to the next, the price for the final product does not. Consider wheat 
contract KWU9 (hard red wheat for delivery on Sept 09) which traded at KBOT at 
$5.49/bushel on July 24, 2009. When we consider that a bushel of wheat weighs 60   
pounds, then a pound of wheat costs $5.49/60 = $0.0915 . Thus in a hypothetical loaf of 
bread that requires 1 pound of wheat and retails at $2  at the bakery, the cost of wheat 
represents only 4.6%  of its retail price. If we consider a cake with similar wheat content 
that retails for $10 , then the cost of wheat represents about 0.9%  of the retail price. 
Thus, even though wheat is the central ingredient in bread, a 10%  increase in the price of 
wheat, which represents a rather sharp short-term increase, will increase the cost of wheat 
by only 0.5%  and 0.09%  of the retail price for the loaf of bread and the cake, 
respectively. 
 Although bread and baked goods are usually differentiated/branded products, 
flour is not. Thus, even though in the short-term, the retail price of baked goods is not 
drastically affected by the day to day fluctuations in the price of wheat, competition for 
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the wheat millers is cutthroat, and efficient management of their procurement and 
production operations is crucial.  
 Based on the above observations, our model assumes demand is independent of 
price at any time .t  We further assume demand is uncorrelated with the returns of the 
stock markets, hence demand risk is fully diversifiable. This assumption is consistent 
with the findings in Berling and Rosling (2005). Under the above assumptions, the 
probability distribution of demand is independent from the probability distribution of the 
price process, and the risk neutral distribution of demand is equal to the historical (true) 
probability distribution of demand, (.) (.)
t t
Q
ξ ξΦ = Φ . 
4.5.   MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
In this section, we provide a stylized model for the operating and financial risk 
management decisions of a flour miller which buys wheat from the commodity market 
and sells flour. We consider the objective of maximizing firm value, i.e., the total 
discounted value of expected cash flows over T  time periods. At each time period t , the 
firm decides (1) how much commodity to order and, (2) the composition of financial 
instruments to hold1. We let tx  denote the number of futures contracts shorted at time t , 
for delivery at 1t + , and  tq denotes the number of commodity contracts purchased at 
time t  to be shipped immediately and received in the mill at 1t + 2.  Regarding the 
flour price, as it is suggested by market data (see Table 4.1), we assume that it is a linear 
1 In our model, we restrict the composition of our financial hedging portfolio to futures contracts. In 
practice, futures contracts (compared to financial options) are much more heavily used by the firms for 
hedging purposes due to their simpler nature and higher liquidity. For example, the KEU09 Sept. 09 wheat 
futures contract at KCBOT showed in mid-July, 2009 an open interest of over 41,000 contracts.  
Comparatively, the total open interest on all option contracts on this same futures contact, including calls 
and puts at all traded strike prices (a total of sixty different options) was less than 5,000 contracts.  
Typically the open interest on a specific option was between 2 and 200 contracts, a very significant drop in 
the liquidity of this instruments when compared to futures. 
2 One contract for wheat is defined at KCBOT as 5,000 bushels, and for shipping purposes is equivalent to 
a full railroad cart. 
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function of the spot price and given by ts λ+ , at time t . Our model also assumes an 
initial financial plan which includes a starting cash reserve, 0y , as well as a pre-
determined sequence of cash outflows, 1= [ ,..., ]Tη η η
?
. These cash outflows account for 
fixed costs of operation, cash transfers to different divisions of the firm, as well as 
possible funding for dividend payments and other financial commitments. 
 Below we provide the stylized sequence of decision and events for the operations 
of the firm at the beginning of time t  :  
 ( i ) First, the firm observes tP  (which implies the current spot price, ts  and the 
futures price, tf ), and the flour demand for the current period, tξ . In reality, millers 
continuously receive orders from customers and meet demand. For ease of exposition, we 
discretize the planning horizon of the firm and assume that demand is observed at the 
beginning of each period. 
 ( ii ) Following this, the firm receives the wheat ordered in the previous period, 
1tq − , and on hand wheat inventories increase from 1tI −  to 1 1t tI q− −+ . Next, if available, 
enough wheat is converted into flour to meet the current period's demand, tξ . Excess 
flour demand is lost, and excess wheat inventory tI  is carried to the next period, at a cost 
of  h  per unit per period. In particular, the miller sells the minimum of 1 1t tI q− −+  and tξ   
at the current flour price, .ts λ+  
 ( iii ) We define the initial cash reserves of the firm as the cash on hand prior to 
receiving the cash flows at the beginning of time t and we denote it as ˆ ;ty  this is the 
cash the firm brings in its transition from period 1t − . Also at the beginning of period t   
the firm receives cash flows from operations, 1 1( ) min( , )t t t t ts I q hIλ ξ− −+ + − , receives the 
(possibly negative) cash flows derived from its financial hedging transactions, 
1 1( )t t tf s x− −− , and it pays out the cash outflows pre-committed in the financial plan, tη . 
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The new pre-order cash reserves, at the beginning of period t  but prior to placing new 
orders become 1 1 1 1ˆ= ( ) min( , ) ( )t t t t t t t t t t ty y s I q hI f s xλ ξ η− − − −+ + + − + − − .  
 ( iv ) The firm places new orders tq , to meet the demand in period 1t +  and 
decides for the composition of its financial instruments tx , to hedge for the commodity 
price risk. After placing the new order, tq , the cash reserves of the firm become 
= [ ] [ ] .t t t t t t t t ty s q y s q y s q
+ −− − − −  
 ( v ) If the cash reserves of the firm at time t  (after ordering tq ) are positive, they 
are invested in liquid short-term assets and they grow at the risk free rate; hence in this 
case the initial cash reserves at 1t +  become 1ˆty +  = ( )(1 ) .f t t tr y s q+ −  On the other hand, 
if the cash reserves are negative (i.e., < 0t t ty s q− ), the firm faces financial distress, and 
it uses costly external funding. Our model of costly financial distress assumes a constant 
premium, > 0,r  in excess of the risk free rate, fr , that is paid proportionately to the 
amount of external financing used. Hence, the initial cash reserves at 1t +  are 
( )1ˆ 1 (1 )( ),t f t t ty r r y s q+ = + + −  which are negative. Thus in general, we can define 1ˆty + = 
( )1 [ ]f t t tr y s q ++ − − (1 )(1 )[ ] ,f t t tr r y s q −+ + − which simplifies to 1ˆty +  =  (1 )( )f t t tr y s q+ −
− (1 )[ ] .f t t tr r y s q −+ −  Hence, at the beginning of time 1t +  the firm pays 
(1 )[ ]f t t tr r y s q
−+ −  for financial distress. At time t, the present value (when tq  is 
decided) of this cost of financial distress is given by 1= [ ] .t t t tFDC r y s q
−
− −  
 Assuming a constant premium > 0r  for external financing implies that this 
short-term debt will be repaid in full with probability one. This assumption is reasonable, 
for example, when the firm's tangible assets, such as real estate and equipment, exceed its 
total liabilities by a large enough margin to cover the financial shortfalls implied by the 
short-term operational and financial decisions. In case of financial shortages, this firm 
will in all likelihood not go into Chapter XI bankruptcy proceedings, as it will be able to 
raise enough capital, and all short-term loans will be paid in full. Even if such a firm is 
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deemed to be not economically viable, its voluntary liquidation will bring enough cash to 
pay all debtholders in full. 
 In general, financial shortage, bankruptcy and liquidation refer to three different 
financial states of a firm. More precisely, a publicly traded firm experiencing a financial 
shortage (or a default) faces financial distress which may or may not lead to filing for 
bankruptcy under Chapter XI. If the firm's debt can be reorganized through private 
negotiations with the debtholders, then the firm does not file for bankruptcy and keeps 
operating. If private negotiations are not viable due to agency problems and informational 
asymmetries then a formal bankruptcy is filed (Senbet and Seward 1995). Ideally, the 
bankruptcy process liquidates the firm only if it is not economically viable. Formally, a 
firm is not economically viable if an alternative use for its assets is more valuable; in this 
case the firm becomes a target for liquidation. If the firm remains economically viable, its 
debt is formally reorganized by the court (Hotchkiss et al. 2008). Therefore, for publicly 
traded firms, liquidation (or the cease of operations) does not depend on the level of debt 
(or financial shortage) but on the economic viability of its operations. In summary, each 
of the three possible outcomes, a private reorganization, Chapter XI bankruptcy 
reorganization, or the liquidation of the firm, may or may not lead to the full payment of 
debt. Therefore, in our model, the constant positive premium for short-term financial 
shortfalls, > 0,r  is not driven by default probabilities, bankruptcy or liquidation, but 
instead the firm is willing to pay this premium due to the transaction costs and time lags 
associated with access to the capital markets. In Figure 4.3, we summarize the sequence 
of events, decisions and cash flows for the miller. 
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Figure 4.3: Sequence of Events, Decisions and Cash Flows for the Miller 
As it is suggested by Figure 4.3, below we describe the multi-period decision 
problem of the firm. For notational convenience, we denote the vector of state variables 
at the beginning of time ,t   as = [ , , ],t t t tS I y P  and we define = 1/(1 )frβ + . 
 For = 1,..., 1,t T −  
0,
( ) = max ( , | )t t t t t tq xt t
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+ − +
= [ ]t t t tFDC r y s q
−−  and  
( ) = , = [ ]T T T T T T T T TV S s I FDC FDC r y s I
−− + . 
 We denote the value of the firm at the beginning of period t  as (.)tV . The first 
term in the objective, ,t ts q−  gives the cost of procurement and the following term, tFDC
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denotes the cost external financing. The last term describes the discounted value of the 
firm's future cash flows. The cash flows due to operations in period t  are given by 
1 1( ) min( , )t t t t ts I q hIλ ξ + ++ + − ; firm sells the minimum of demand and on-hand inventory 
at the current price ( ),ts λ+  and pays for holding cost for the left-over inventory. Cash 
flows from financial transactions are given by 1( )t t tf s x+− . Finally, the last term inside 
the expectation operator is the cost-to-go function. Constraints (4.1) and (4.2) in the 
model denote the inventory and cash flow balances, respectively. In the final period T , 
the firm does not place new orders and salvages the excess inventory at the current spot 
price. We start our analysis by showing that the objective function is concave in the 
decision variables.  
Lemma 4.5.1. (Convexity). ( , | .)t t tJ q x  is jointly concave in decision variables, tq  and 
,tx   for = 1,..., 1t T − . 
 Next, we underline the fact that financial hedging impacts firm value and the 
operating decisions only if there is a cost for financial distress. 
Lemma 4.5.2. (Hedging without FDC). When there is no financial distress cost, i.e., 
= 0,r   financial hedging is immaterial to firm value and operating decisions.   
 Under the risk neutral measure , |= [ ],
Q
t t P P tt t
f E sτ ττ+ ++  and the expected value of 
financial transactions is zero. Further, without a cost for financial distress, firm's cash 
flows are unaffected by financial hedging. In particular, when = 0,r  we are in the Miller-
Modigliani framework with no capital market frictions, hence buying and selling futures 
contracts do not affect the firm value. This argument can be generalized to other forms of 
correctly priced financial hedges. In the reminder of this section, we explore the 
interaction between financial distress cost, operating decisions and financial hedging 
under two common business models in practice. In Section 4.5.1, we discuss a make-to-
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order business plan where demand is known before committing to the purchase of wheat, 
and in Section 4.5.2 we analyze a make-to-stock business plan with uncertain demand.  
4.5.1. Make-to-Order (MTO) Business Plan 
In this section, we assume that the firm may observe the customer demand prior 
to committing for the production plan. In particular, when shipment and production lead 
times are relatively short compared to the delivery lead times of the customer orders, 
firms effectively operate in an MTO fashion. The following theorem shows the optimal 
production decisions of the firm when demand is known and deterministic over the 
planning horizon, and there is no cost for financial distress.  
Theorem 4.5.1. (Optimal Production without FDC). Suppose demand is known and 
deterministic over the planning horizon, and there is no financial distress cost, i.e., = 0r . 
Then, the optimal production plan is given by 1=t tq ξ∗ + , and = 0,tI ∗  if 
1 1( ) 0t ts f hβ− −− + − ≤   and 1( ) 0t ts fβ λ−− + + ≥   for = 1,..., 1.t T −  
Theorem 4.5.1 shows that the firm exactly orders and produces for the next 
period's demand and does not carry inventory between the periods, if the spread of spot 
and futures prices satisfies two usual economic conditions, in each period. The first 
condition, ( ) 0t tf h sβ − − ≤ , states that the convenience yield is non-negative (assuming 
the holding cost is paid at the end of the period). This condition always holds in 
commodity markets since negative convenience yield creates arbitrage opportunities. The 
second condition, 1( ) 0,t ts fβ λ−− + + ≥  requires that the expected profit margin is non-
negative in each period; otherwise it is not profitable to meet the demand. Note that these 
results are independent of the financial hedging decisions when there is no financial 
distress cost. 
 Next, we investigate the impact of financial distress cost. We first consider the 
following single period MTO model, where for ease of exposure we assume that the 
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initial inventory level and cash outflows are set to zero, 1 1= 0, = 0, I η and there is no 
financial distress in the first period, 1 = 0FDC  . 
 
1 1 1 1 | 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 22 10,1 1
( ) = max [( ) min( , ) ( ) ( )]QP Pq xV S s q E s q hI f s x V Sβ λ ξ≥ − + + − + − +           (MTO 1)  
 2 1 2. . = [ ]s t I q ξ +−  
     2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2= ( )/ ( ) min( , ) ( )y y s q s q hI f s xβ λ ξ η− + + − + − −  
where,  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) = , = [ ]V S s I FDC FDC r y s I
−− +  
Theorem 4.5.2. (Optimal Production with FDC and without Hedging). Suppose the 
demand is known and deterministic, and the firm operates for a single period with no 
financial hedging. Then, when there is a cost for financial distress > 0r  , the firm  
(i) orders strictly less than the future demand, i.e., 1 2< ,q ξ∗   if  
                  2 1 1 1 2 2 20( ) = ( ) ( / ) ( ) < 0
b
a s f r s s s dsξ β λ β β λ φ− + + + − + +∫                  (4.3) 
    where , 
1
1 1 2 1
2
= / , = / ,b s yκ β λ κ η βξ + − −  
(ii) and exactly orders for the future demand, i.e., 1 2=q ξ∗ , otherwise. 
 Theorem 4.5.2 describes the conditions under which it is not economical to meet 
all of the future demand, when there is a risk of incurring financial distress cost. In 
condition (4.3), 2( )a ξ  represents the marginal change in the firm value when 1 2=q ξ . 
Hence, if 2( )a ξ  this is less than zero, the manager should order less than the future 
demand, and otherwise it is optimal to meet all of the demand. Note that the sum of first 
two terms in 2( )a ξ  is non-negative by assumption, and the third term may be either 
positive or negative depending on the net cash transfers, future demand, sales margin and 
current spot price. The argument of the integral in 2( )a ξ  represents the profit margin of 
the firm at 1t +  for a particular realization of the future spot price 2s . When the future 
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spot price is less than b , the firm faces financial distress and pays a premium r  for 
external financing. 
 The financial state of the firm is one of the key determinants of the financial 
distress threshold, b . The parameter 1κ  denotes the pre-committed net cash outflows of 
the firm, i.e., cash transfers 2 ,η  net of pre-order cash reserves 1/y β . In particular, if the 
net cash outflows are very high, then the firm faces financial distress for almost all the 
future spot price realizations. In this case b  is very high and the integral term in (4.3) is 
positive, so the firm is unlikely to under-produce. On the other extreme, if the net cash 
outflows are very low, then the firm is unlikely to face financial distress in the future. So, 
the integral term in (4.3) is close to zero and the firm does not under-produce again. Only 
for moderate levels of net cash outflows, the integral term can be negative and the firm 
chooses an optimal quantity less than the current demand.  
 So far we have identified the optimal operating policy of the firm when the 
managers engage in no financial hedging transactions. In the following two results, we 
examine the impact of financial hedging on the operating decisions and firm value, when 
there is a cost for financial distress. First, we identify the optimal hedging policy.  
Theorem 4.5.3. (Optimal Hedging). Suppose the demand is known and deterministic, and 
the firm operates for a single period. Under a positive financial distress cost, if the firm 
decides to order and produce 1q  then it is optimal to short 1 1=x q
∗  units of futures 
contracts with futures price 1. f  This hedging policy completely eliminates the price risk.  
 Theorem 4.5.3 shows that the optimal hedging decision is intimately linked to the 
operating plans. At = 1t , the firm commits to 1q  which will be sold at = 2 t at an 
uncertain price 2 .s λ+  By shorting 1q  units of futures contracts at = 1t  the firm 
effectively fixes the future sales price to 1 .f λ+  Hence, the price risk associated with 
future sales is eliminated. 
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Theorem 4.5.4. (Joint Optimal Hedging and Production). Suppose demand is known and 
deterministic, and the firm operates for a single period. Then, under a positive financial 
distress cost, it is optimal to produce 1 2=q ξ∗  and hedge 1 2=x ξ∗ . 
 Theorem 4.5.4 indicates that under the optimal financial hedging policy, the 
under-investment problem in Theorem 4.5.2 can be totally eliminated. That is, the firm 
always produces to meet the demand, regardless of its financial status. Note that, 
financial hedging may not totally eliminate the financial distress cost. Indeed, hedged 
firm may still need to pay for financial distress, but it is optimal to completely hedge for 
the price risk. As a result, financial hedging, when optimally integrated with the operating 
decisions, enables the firm to increase its output level and generate more value for the 
shareholders. 
4.5.2   Make-to-Stock (MTS) Business Plan 
 In this section, we investigate the optimal operating and financial hedging 
decisions of the firm when both demand and price are uncertain. As in the MTO case, we 
focus on a single-stage problem involving two periods only. The firm commits for wheat 
at the beginning of the current period, and demand is realized at the beginning of the next 
period. Excess demand is lost and excess inventory is salvaged at the current spot price. 
The single-stage MTS model is given below.  
1 1 1 1 , | 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 22 2 10,1 1
( ) = max [( ) min( , ) ( ) ( )]Q P Pq xV S s q E s q hI f s x V Sξβ λ ξ≥ − + + − + − +        (MTS 1) 
2 1 2. . = [ ]s t I q ξ +−
2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2= ( )/ ( ) min( , ) ( )y y s q s q hI f s xβ λ ξ η− + + − + − −  
where,  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) = , = [ ]V S s I FDC FDC r y s I
−− + . 
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In this section, we denote the probability density and cumulative distribution 
functions of the demand by 
2
(.)ξφ  and 2 (.)ξΦ , respectively. Further, for notational 
convenience, we omit the subscripts for quantity and hedging decision variables. The 
following lemma describes a benchmark result for the MTS case when there is no 
financial distress cost. 
Lemma 4.5.3. (Optimal Production without FDC) Suppose the firm operates for a single 
period under both stochastic demand and price. Then, when there is no financial distress 
cost, i.e., = 0r , necessary and sufficient optimality condition is given by:  
               | 2 1 22 1[ ] ( ) ( ) = 0
Q
P PE s s h h qξβ β β λ− − + + Φ ,                   (4.4) 
and the optimal quantity | 2 11 12 1 1 1
2 2
[ ]
= ( ) = ( )
( ) ( )
Q
P Pnv
E s s f sq
h hξ ξ
β βλ β βλ
β λ β λ
− −− + − +Φ Φ+ + .  
 When there is no cost of financial distress, the firm chooses a newsvendor-type 
optimal quantity which depends on the spread of spot and futures prices, 1 1f sβ − . As the 
futures price increases, the firm is more likely to sell at a higher price and hence the 
optimal order quantity increases. We also refer to nvq  as the first-best production quantity 
(operating level) of the firm. Note that, since the convenience yield is non-negative, i.e., 
1 1 0s h fβ β+ − ≥ , nvq  is finite. Next, we quantify the impact of financial distress cost in 
the MTS framework.  
Theorem 4.5.5. (Optimal Production with FDC) Suppose the firm operates for a single 
period under both stochastic demand and price, with no financial hedging. And, the 
probability of incurring financial distress is strictly between zero and one when the firm 
orders for the first-best production quantity, nvq . Then, when there is a positive financial 
distress cost, i.e., > 0r , the firm always under-produces compared to nvq , i.e., < nvq q∗ .   
 When there is no risk of incurring FDC, the marginal benefit of an additional unit 
is zero at nvq . However, if there is a risk of incurring FDC, when committed to the first-
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best production quantity, then the marginal benefit of an additional unit is negative, since 
it increases the firm’s exposure to financial distress risk. Hence, the firm would decrease 
its production level below its first-best level, nvq , so as to balance the risk of financial 
distress and operating profits. The following theorem characterizes the optimal hedging 
decision of the firm.  
Theorem 4.5.6. (Optimal Hedging). Suppose the firm operates for a single period under 
both stochastic demand and price. Then, under a positive financial distress cost, if the 
firm decides to order and produce q units, it is also optimal to short =x q∗ units of 
futures contracts with futures price 1.f  This hedging policy completely eliminates the 
price risk.  
Theorem 4.5.6 shows that, similar to the MTO case, it is optimal to completely 
hedge for the price risk. Substituting for the optimal hedging policy, (MTS 1) can be 
stated as a function of the quantity decision only: 
1 1 1 1 1 220
1 1 1 2 22
( ) = max ( ) ( ) [ ]
[ / ( / ) ( )[ ] ]
q
V S s q f h E q
rE y f s q h q
ξ
ξ
β λ λ ξ




− + + − + −
− + + − − + − −
Next, we examine the operating decisions of the firm under the optimal financial 
hedging plan.  
Theorem 4.5.7. (Joint Optimal Policy). Suppose the firm operates for a single period 
under stochastic demand and price; and there is a positive financial distress cost. Let 2
wξ  
denote the lowest (worst) demand scenario. Then, under the optimal hedging policy, the 
optimal quantity fq  is  
 (i) equal to the first-best operating level nvq , if  
1 1 1( / )
nvf s qκ λ β≥ + −  or 1 1 1 2( / ) ( )nv wf h s q hκ β λ ξ≤ − − + +  
 (ii) and less than the first-best operating level nvq , otherwise. 
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If the firm's net cash outflows are too high to be covered by the revenues from 
operations, even when it sells all of the first-best operating quantity nvq , i.e., 
1 1 1( / )
nvf s qκ λ β≥ + − , then the firm does not deviate from its first-best operating plan. In 
this case, since the firm is guaranteed to face financial distress at the first-best operating 
level, under-production (producing less than nvq ) does not help to reduce the firm's 
exposure to financial distress risk. Similarly, if the firm's net cash outflows are low 
enough to be covered by the revenues, even under the worst-case demand scenario, 
i.e., 1 1 1 2( / )( )
nv wf h s qκ β ξ≤ − − − , then the firm never uses external financing and chooses 
the first-best operating level, nvq .  
On the other hand, if 1κ  is between these two cases, then the chances of incurring 
financial distress cost is strictly between 0 and 1, when the firm commits for nvq . 
Consequently, in this case, a marginal reduction in the quantity commitment of the firm 
reduces the firm's exposure to financial distress, and hence the firm chooses a more 
conservative operating plan by under-producing. As in the MTO case, the financial state 
of the firm plays a key role in the operating decisions under the optimal hedging policy. 
Next, we discuss the impact of hedging on the optimal operating plans.  
Theorem 4.5.8. Suppose the firm operates for a single period under both stochastic 
demand and price. Let q∗  be the optimal quantity when there is a positive financial 
distress cost and there is no hedging. Then, nv fq q q∗≥ ≥  .   
 Theorem 4.5.8 shows that financial hedging reduces the firm's exposure to 
financial distress and enables it to adopt more aggressive production plans. However, 
unlike the MTO case, it may not be possible to completely eliminate the under-
production problem.  
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4.6.   CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, we examine the joint operating and financial hedging decisions of 
a shareholder-value maximizing firm, with costly financial distress. Although our 
research is motivated by the flour milling industry, our findings can be easily generalized 
to other commodity processor firms which are exposed to fluctuations in commodity 
prices. As it is well known in the finance literature, in the absence of frictions, engaging 
in financial hedging is a neutral proposition. That is, it should not affect the optimal 
production plan, and it does not create value for firm's shareholders. However, when the 
firm faces capital market frictions, such as in our case costly financial distress, financial 
hedging can contribute to shareholder-wealth creation. Our findings show that the cost of 
financial distress forces firms to adopt more conservative operating plans by under-
producing with respect to their first-best production levels. We first quantify this under-
production problem, and then illustrate how financial markets can be used to mitigate it 
and generate more wealth for the shareholders.  
 We show that in a single-period MTO production environment, the risk of 
incurring financial distress, due to commodity price fluctuations, may deter the firm from 
meeting all customer orders especially when the firm’s planned cash outflows are well 
balanced with the operating profits. We illustrate that the financial distress risk due to 
commodity price fluctuations can be totally eliminated by taking a short position in the 
futures market, equivalent to the production commitments. Consequently, such a 
financial hedging policy changes the optimal operating decisions, and further enables the 
firm to meet all the future demand. In other words, the under-production problem in an 
MTO production environment can be totally eliminated by financial hedging. 
 Similarly in an MTS production environment, with demand and price 
uncertainty, financial distress risk may lead the firm produce less than the first-best 
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production level. In this case, due to demand uncertainty, it is not possible to completely 
eliminate the financial distress risk and the allied under-production problem by trading in 
the futures market. However, we show that hedging for the price risk still adds value to 
the firm by reducing the firm's exposure to financial distress, and mitigating the under-
production problem.  
 Maximizing firm value, defined as the total properly discounted value of 
expected cash flows, is a central concern for the managers of publicly traded companies. 
In this chapter, we provide a model, within the value-framework of finance, which links 
the financial risk management and the operational decisions of a value maximizing firm, 
under the presence of capital market imperfections. An overarching implication of our 
analysis is that publicly traded firms may significantly increase their market value, and 
generate more wealth for their shareholders by effectively integrating their financial risk 
management and production decisions. We show that a coordinated financial hedging and 
operating plan contributes to shareholder-wealth creation (1) by reducing the firm's 
exposure to financial distress risk and mitigating the corresponding costs, and (2) by 
enabling the firm to operate at a higher level of output. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Future Work  
In this dissertation, we explore the effective integration of risk management and 
operational decisions so as to improve the firm value and profits, and to create more 
wealth for the shareholders. We present analytical models investigating the value of 
various operational and financial hedging strategies commonly implemented in practice. 
Our results demonstrate that these hedging strategies, when effectively integrated with 
the operating plans, may significantly reduce the firms’ exposure to business 
uncertainties and allied risks, and hence help to create more value.  
The second chapter of my dissertation focuses on the benefits of process and 
operational flexibility and their interaction in a multi-period MTO production 
environment. We observe that both process and operational flexibility create an 
operational hedge against the demand fluctuations and the associated risk of backlogging, 
through increasing the effective processing capacity of the firm by enabling dynamic 
capacity reallocations. We show that the value of process flexibility depends on the 
operating policies implemented in the production floor, the variability of product demand 
and the capacity availability of the firm as well as the length of the planning horizon. 
Indeed, our findings demonstrate that process flexibility may not only be used to hedge 
against the demand uncertainty, but may also be employed to protect against possible 
suboptimal operating decisions in the future. In particular, myopic operating policies, 
which are common in practice, can be hedged through adopting more process flexibility 
prior to the beginning of the sales season. Moreover, we demonstrate that operational 
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flexibility is most valuable when demand and capacity is well-balanced and demand 
variability is high.  
In this chapter, we have assumed that product demand is the only source of risk in 
the supply chain. We believe that an interesting and fruitful research direction is to 
investigate the value of capacity flexibility when there are other sources of risks and 
uncertainties associated with capacity, competition and technology.  
In the third chapter, we focus on operating and investment strategies for a 
financially constrained startup firm when making short-term production and long-term 
investment decisions under bankruptcy risk. Our results highlight an interesting 
operational hedging behavior between the long-term process investment decisions and the 
short-term production commitments of the firm. That is, a change in the process 
investment policy of the startup is always accompanied by a counter-action in the 
production decisions. We show that aggressive (conservative) investment plans are 
always hedged through aggressive (conservative) production decisions.  
In particular, when faced with stochastic bankruptcy risk, the startup firm 
sacrifices some short-term profits by deviating from its first-best production plan (i.e., the 
monopoly quantity). In the conservative case, the firm under-produces so as to allocate 
more cash to process investment while controlling the survival chances. Further, 
depending upon the competitor’s cost, startup’s technological performance and aggregate 
demand, the firm may also invest aggressively by increasing the process investment 
amount above the expected monopoly profits. In this case, the startup also produces more 
than the monopoly level to cover the higher bankruptcy risk due to the aggressive process 
investment plans. We also identify and analyze two main factors driving aggressive 
behavior in startups: (1) the existence of positive NPV investment opportunities and (2) 
the immediate economical viability of the firm.  
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Further, we show that startup firms optimally adopting aggressive (conservative) 
policies go bankrupt (survive) with more (less) than a probability of 50%. Consequently, 
under stochastic demand, we establish the optimal operating decisions and the allied 
survival chances as an appropriate measure of startup’s risk preferences. From this 
perspective, the existence of aggressive policies is interesting and consistent with 
empirical observations claiming that an average startup firm goes bankrupt and, only a 
small portion of the new firms eventually survive and grow (Gompers and Lerner 2004, 
Shane 2007).  
In this third chapter, we have specifically studied investment in strategic process 
improvement which is aimed at unit cost reduction. We have excluded decisions such as 
new product development and brand growth. Further, startups in our model do not 
consider exit strategies, e.g., mergers or acquisition choices, which are also central to 
process investment decision. It would be useful to explore how investment in process 
development change without financially risking the startup’s survival when the startup’s 
objective is to signal a potentially strong market presence in order to look more attractive 
for a takeover. This could alter the startup’s decisions, and hence, yield different results. 
We also do not consider venture capital (VC) funded startups which may receive multiple 
rounds of funding. Exploring the interaction between the startup and the venture 
capitalist, when making short-term and long-term business plans, is also a very promising 
future research direction. 
In the fourth chapter of my dissertation, we extend our analyses to study the 
integrated operating and financial hedging decisions of a shareholder-value maximizing 
publicly traded firm, with costly financial distress. Similar to the effect of bankruptcy risk 
in Chapter 3, costly financial distress changes the optimal operating decisions for 
publicly traded firms, and leads them to choose more conservative operating plans via 
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under-producing with respect to their first-best production levels. We demonstrate that 
financial hedging policies, when appropriately integrated with the operating plans, 
mitigate this under-production problem and enable firms adopt more aggressive 
production plans by reducing the firm’s exposure to financial distress risk.  
This research contributes to the existing operations management literature, by 
studying the risk management decisions of a public corporation within the value 
framework of finance; hence our findings do not require any specific assumptions about 
the investors' utility functions. Further we add to the literature by explicitly examining 
the impact of costly financial distress on hedging and operating plans. 
In summary, integrating risk management and operating decisions is a new and 
promising research direction which offers valuable managerial insights in the field of 
operations management. This dissertation is one of the first works in this field, and it 
provides a better understanding of integrated risk management within the framework of 
established firms as well as small and start-up businesses. We strongly believe that our 
findings and analyses can be extended for many other business cases so as to develop 
new managerial insights. 
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Managing Capacity Flexibility in Make-to-Order Production 
Environments 
A.1. Explanation of Notation and Cut Calculations 
krt
i
,,π  = optimal dual price in period t for replication r under scenario k, for the balance  
   constraint for family i 
krt
j
,,γ  = optimal dual price in period t for replication r under scenario k, for the




,λ  = optimal dual price in period t for replication r under scenario k, for the design              
    constraint for assigning family i to line j 
krt
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,,ρ  = optimal dual price in period t for replication r under scenario k, for the cut
    constraint l 










rtrt βββ  = cut gradient term 
Then, during the backward pass of the algorithm in replication r and period t, the 
following cut is generated. 
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Rearranging the terms we obtain:  
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A.2. Computational Settings for the Decomposition Method 
While constructing an empirical scenario tree and the associated approximating 
problem (EDAM) we use a sample size of 100, i.e., |S| = 100. Then, while solving the 
EDAM, with the algorithm of Section 2.4.2, the replication limit R is set to 500. We 
observed that the improvement in the lower bound is not significant after 500 iterations. 
For lower bound estimation we used ν  = 30, that is we have generated 30 i.i.d. sample 
scenario trees and the associated EDAMs and solved each model generating 30 i.i.d. 
lower bound estimates. Then, to estimate the cost of the feasible policy we used η  = 
20,000 demand sample paths. We also employed Latin Hypercube Sampling, while 
generating i.i.d. sample scenario trees, for variance reduction purpose. 
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Appendix B 
Production, Process Investment and Survival of Debt Financed Startup 
Firms 
B.1. Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1:  
Substituting for the second period monopoly profits, and suppressing the 
subscripts and the superscripts yields the model: 
2
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(1 )( ))( (1 ) ) (1 ) ( )
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Now we observe that the single stage problem is separable in q and A, and can be written 
as: 
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2
r c Ag A r A θ μ− + −= − + + . 
Since f(q) is concave, it is maximized at * (1 )
2
r cq θ − += . Maximizing f(q) also 
maximizes the right-hand side of the survival constraint, hence *q  gives the optimal 
quantity decision. Following, by substituting * (1 )
2
r cq θ − +=  into the survival constraint, 
we obtain the upper bound on the first period investment as 
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Here g(A) is convex and the optimal solution is a boundary solution. Hence, the 
optimal investment amount can be found by evaluating the g(A) function for the values of 
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Proof of Proposition 3.3.2: 
Following the developments in the proof of Proposition 3.3.1, when the return on 
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Finally, substituting for the optimal policy we obtain: 




( (1 )( )) (1 ) 0
4
( (1 ) ) / .
2
tur c A r A if
r c o w
θ μ σ
π θ
⎧ − + − + + Δ ≥⎪⎪= ⎨ − +⎪⎪⎩  
   
Proof of Proposition 3.3.3:  
i) Since a Cournot game is played in the second period, startup’s and competitor’s 
equilibrium quantities are given by ( )2 12 2(1 ) ,3
r c A
q
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Then, following the developments in the proof of Proposition 3.3.2 above, it is 
still optimal to produce the monopoly level and, the investment threshold and optimal 
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Proof of Corollary 3.3.1: 
Note that cΔ  is linear increasing in λ . Hence, solving 0bc cΔ − Δ =  for λ , gives 
the desired result. (We assume parameters guarantee positive quantities and positive 
second period cost, i.e., 2q , cq  and 2c  are non-negative.)   
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1: 
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τ θ λ βα ψ β ϕ ε β ε
ε




− − + −
+ + −+
− − + −










1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
, 0
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
max {( ( , ) ) ( ) }
( ) 2( ) ( ) (1 )( )[ ](1 ( ))
9
q A
E p q c q r c q A A





τ θ λ θ λ μ μ σ πα θ
≥
− − + −




1 1 1 1 1
, 0
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
max ( ) ( 1)( )
( ) 2( ) ( ) (1 )( )[ ](1 ( ))
9
q A
q q r c q A




τ θ λ θ λ μ μ σ πα θ
≥
− − + +
+ + − + + − + + + + ++ − + −
 
Finally, suppressing the subscripts and superscripts, we obtain the result: 
 
1
, 0 , 0
2 2 2 2 2 2
max ( , ) max ( ) ( 1)( )
( ) 2( ) ( ) (1 )( )[ ](1 ( ))
9
q A q A
f q A q q r cq A




τ θ λ θ λ μ μ σ πα θ
≥ ≥
= − − + +
+ + − + + − + + + + ++ − + −
Recall that 1{( ( , ) (1 ) ) }m m mE p q r c qπ ε= − +? , ( (1 ) )2m




π π−= + . First, we 
partition the feasible decision space into the following four regions: 
(i) mq q≤   and mA A≤  
(ii) mq q≤  and mA A≥  
(iii) mq q≥  and mA A≤  
(iv) mq q≥   and mA A≥  
Let 
2 2 2 2 2 2( ) 2( ) ( )[ ]
9
kc kc k A k AD τ θ λ θ λ μ μ σα + + − + + − + += , then at the optimality 
it must hold that: 
2
( , ) (1 )( ) (1 )2 ( 1) ( )*(1 ) 0f q A r cq A r Aq r c D q
q q q
π πθ ϕ θ∂ + + + + += − − + − + − − =∂ . 
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Following, it is easy to observe ( , )f q A
q
∂
∂ > 0 for every decision vector in region (ii) and 
( , )f q A
q
∂
∂ < 0 for every decision vector in region (iii). Hence the optimal policy should be 
either in region (i) or (iv). This concludes the desired “if and only if” argument in the 
proposition. 
Note that the proof does not depend on the convexity of ( , )f q A . Indeed, ( , )f q A  
is not generally convex and in this proof, we don’t address the optimal investment, A*. 
Recall that the joint optimization of A and q is not tractable analytically. Indeed, numeric 
analyses show that at the optimality, when both A and q varied simultaneously, optimal 
policy may be either in region (i) and (iv).   
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2: 
Recall that the demand shock tε?  (t = 1, 2) has a normal probability density 
function, (.)ϕ , with mean zero and variance v2. It is sufficient to show that the argument 
of the survival probability, (1 ) (1 )r A q r c
q
x π θ+ + + − + += ,  is less (greater) than or equal 
to zero if and only if the optimal operating policy is aggressive (conservative). Since 
(1 )
2m






x π + + + −= . Finally also observe that the first order optimality condition for 
q, i.e., ( , ) 0f q A
q










π−≤ +  if mq q≤ . 






π−≥ ≥+ . Consequently, the first two terms of x is larger than 2 mq  and hence, 
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0x ≥ . Now, suppose the optimal operating policy is conservative. Then, by definition 





π−≤ ≤+ . So, the first two terms of x is less than 2 mq  and hence, 
0x ≤ . 
Next, we prove the only if part of the argument. Consider an optimal operating 




π + + + − ≥ , i.e., the survival chances are less than 





π−≤ ≤+ . Then, 
(1 )r A
q
qπ + + ≤  and hence, (1 ) 2 0mr A q qq
π + + + − ≤ . So, by 
contradiction, the policy should be aggressive. The conservative case can be proven 
similarly.   
 
Proof of Corollary 3.4.1 and Corollary 3.4.2:  
 Immediate economic viability, 0mπ π− > , implies that 0(1 )
m
mA r
π π−= >+ . When 
there are no investment opportunities firm has to set 0A =  and hence mA A< . From 
Proposition 3.4.1, this implies that the optimal policy should be in region (i) and mq q< . 
When there are investment opportunities, i.e., 0A ≥ , the optimal solution may be in 
either region (i) or (iv). Indeed, in Section 3.4.2, we provide various numerical examples 
for both cases.  
 On the other hand, if 0mπ π− < , then 0(1 )
m
mA r
π π−= <+ . In this case, regardless of 
the existence of investment opportunities mA A>  and hence, the optimal policy should lie 
in region (iv) and mq q> .   
 
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1: 
(i) Let ( )f q = ( )q c qθ − − , and 2( ))( ) ( )
2
c Ag A A θ μ− −= − +  . Then the maximization 
problem can be stated as:  
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f q g A







Or equivalently,    { }
max ( ) ( )
. . min ( ),
, 0
f q g A




















θ θ −= + ≥ . 
Then, if 1 mq q≥ , the debt constraint never binds as shown in Figure A.1. Hence 
Proposition 3.3.1 applies. More specifically, this case can be stated as:  
2 4
2 2 2





θ −≥ = + . This proves the first part of the 
proposition. 
Figure A.1: An Illustration of the Debt Constraint 
ii) Suppose mL cq< , then the debt constraint should always bind since any excess cash 
can be used to increase production and increase profits.  
iii) Suppose maxm mcq L cq A≤ ≤ +  and the return on investment is very close to zero. 
Then, the firm simply produces up to the monopoly level and does not use the rest of the 





Proof of Corollary 3.5.2:  
From the proof of Proposition 3.3.1, when there is no debt capacity, investment threshold 
is given by: max( ) (0)g A gΔ = − . When there is an explicit debt capacity, L, then for any 
feasible of production policy q, maximum investment budget is given by: 
{ }max max( , ) min ( ),lA q L f q L cq A= − < . Next, since g(.) is increasing in A,  
max( , ) ( ) (0)
l
lq L g A gΔ = − ≤ Δ .   
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B.2. Computational Procedure 










max {( ( , ) ) ( ) }
( 2(1 ) ( , ; )){ | ( ) }
9
q A
z E p q c q r c q A A




θ ξ βα π ε π
≥
= − − + −





Since this optimization problem has only two decision variables, we implement a 
search algorithm, in C++, to find the optimal decisions for each set of parameter values. 
This algorithm is available from the authors on request. For example, in order to 
construct Figure 3.6, we first fix μ and then solve (3.3) optimally for varying values of 
λ , and we determine the critical value(s) of λ after which the firm switches its optimal 
investment strategy. Then, by connecting these critical values with a smooth line we 
arrive at Figure 3.6. 
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Appendix C 
An Integrated Approach to Commodity Risk Management 
C.1. Proofs 
Proof of Lemma  4.5.1:  
Final period's objective, 1 1 1( , | .),T T TJ q x− − −  is concave in decision variables 
1 1( , )T Tq x− − . Therefore, by preservation of concavity under maximization, ( , | .)t t tJ q x  is 
concave for = 1,..., 1t T − .   
Proof of Lemma  4.5.2:  
This result follows from the fact that | 11= [ ]
Q
t P P tt t
f E s ++ .   
Proof of Theorem 4.5.1: 
Under deterministic demand, final period's problem with no financial distress cost 
is given below (note that the cash reserves and financial hedging is immaterial to the firm 
value):  
1 1 1 1 101
( ) = max ( | )T T T T TqT
V S J q S− − − − −≥−
 
where 1 1 1 1 | 1 11( | .) = {( ) min( , ) ( ) }
Q
T T T T P P T T T T T TT T
J q s q E s I q s h Iβ λ ξ− − − − − −−− + + + + −   and 
1 1= [ ]T T T TI I q ξ +− −+ −  . 
Noting that | 11[ ] =
Q
P P T TT T
E s f −− , the first partial derivative can be stated as: 
1 1
1 1 { > } 1 { }1 1 1 1
1
( | .) = ( ) ( ) .T T T T I q T I qT T T T T T
T
J q s f h I f I
q ξ ξ
β β λ− − − − + − + ≤− − − −−
∂ − + − + +∂  
Hence, 1 1=  T T Tq Iξ∗− −−  if 1 1( ) 0T Ts fβ λ− −− + + ≥   and 1 1( ) 0T Ts f hβ− −− + − ≤ . 
By induction this result extends for = 1,..., 1.t T −  So, 1 2 1=q Iξ∗ −  and 
1= , = 0,t t tq Iξ∗ ∗+   if 1( ) 0t ts fβ λ−− + + ≥   and 1 1( ) 0t ts f hβ− −− + − ≤  for = 2,..., 1.t T −  
Letting 1 = 0I  gives the desired result in the theorem.   
Proof of Theorem 4.5.2: 
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 Substituting for 2 (.)V , and evaluating the expectation, the single period MTO 
model with no financial hedging becomes: 
1 1 1 1 101
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 201
| 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 22 1
( ) = max ( | )
max ( ) min( , ) ( )[ ]





V S J q S
s q f q f h q
r E y s q s q s h q
β λ ξ β ξ





= − + + + − −
+ − + + + − − −
 
Now suppose 1 2 q ξ≥ then,  
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
| 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 22 1
( | ) = ( ) ( )( )
1[ ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ]QP P
J q S s q f f h q
r E y s q s s h q
β λ ξ β ξ
β λ ξ ξ ηβ
−
− + + + − −
− − + + + − − −  
Consequently, the first partial derivative is given by:  
1
1 1 1 2 2 20
1
(.) 1= ( ) ( ) ( )
aJ s f h r s s h s ds
q
β β φβ
∂ − + − + − + −∂ ∫ , 
 where 1 1 1 2 1 2 2
1
( )/= .y s q hq ha
q
β λξ ξ η− + − + + +  




∂ ≤∂ . This implies that the 
optimal quantity cannot be larger than 2 .ξ   
Now suppose 1 2q ξ≤  then,  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 1 1 1 2 1 22 1
1( | ) = ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]QP PJ q S s q f q E r y s q s qβ λ β λ ηβ
−− + + − − + + −  
Consequently, the first partial derivative is given by:  
1
1 1 1 1 2 2 20
1
(.) = ( ) = ( ) ( / ) ( )
bJ a q s f r s s s ds
q
β λ β β λ φ∂ − + + + − + +∂ ∫ ,  
where 2 1 1
1
/= / .yb s
q
η β β λ− + −  
 Hence, when there is no financial hedging, the firm under-produces if  
2( )a ξ  = 1 1 1 2 2 20( ) ( / ) ( ) < 0
b
s f r s s s dsβ λ β β λ φ− + + + − + +∫ .   
Proof of Theorem 4.5.3: 
 For a given quantity decision, 1,q  the firm solves the following hedging problem: 
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1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
1
( ) = max ( ) min( , ) ( )[ ]
x
V S s q f q f h qβ λ ξ β ξ +− + + + − −    
        | 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 22 1
1[ ( ) ( ) min( , ) ( ) ( )[ ] ]QP PE r y s q s q f s x s h qβ λ ξ ξ ηβ
+ −− − + + + − + − − −    
 Since the hedging decision only impacts the financial distress term:  
1 1 1 1
1
( ) = arg min ( | .)
x
x q D x∗  
| 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 22 1
1
1= arg min [ ( ) ( ) min( , ) ( ) ( )[ ] ] .QP P
x
E y s q s q f s x s h qλ ξ ξ ηβ
+ −− + + + − + − − −
Now suppose 1 2q ξ≤  then,  
1 1 1 1 | 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 22 1
1 1
1( ) = arg min ( | .) = arg min [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ] .QP P
x x
x q D x E y s q s q f s xλ ηβ
∗ −− + + + − −    
 Following the first partial derivate is given by: 
1 1
1 2 2 20
1
( | .) = ( ) ( )
bD x f s s ds
x
φ∂ −∂ ∫   if 1 1q x≤  , and  
1 1
1 2 2 2
1
( | .) = ( ) ( )
b
D x f s s ds
x
φ∞∂ −∂ ∫   if 1 1.q x≥  
 Observing that 1 1( | .)D x  is convex and 1 1 1
1




∂  the optimal hedging decision 
1 1( )x q
∗  1= q . (The case for 1 2 ,q ξ≥  can be shown similarly.)    
Proof of Theorem 4.5.4: 
Substituting for the optimal hedging policy given in Theorem 4.5.3, we obtain the 
following maximization problem as a function of the quantity decision only:  
1 1 1 1 | 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 22 101
( ) = max {( ) min( , ) ( ) ( )[ ] }QP PqV S s q E s q f s q s h qβ λ ξ ξ +≥ − + + + − + − −    
     | 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 22 1
1[ ( ) ( ) min( , ) ( ) ( )[ ] ]QP PrE y s q s q f s q s h qβ λ ξ ξ ηβ
+ −− − + + + − + − − −    
1 1 1 1 1 201
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
= max ( ) ( )[ ]
1[ ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ]
q
s q f q h q
r y s q f q h q
β λ β λ ξ




− + + − + −
− − + + − + − −
1 1 1 1 201
1 1 1 1 1 2 2
= max ( ( ) ) ( )[ ]
[ / ( / ) ( )[ ] ]
q
f s q h q
r y f s q h q
β λ β λ ξ




+ − − + −
− + + − − + − −
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Suppose 1 2q ξ≤  then, 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 20 01 1
( ) = max ( | .) = max( ( ) ) [ / ( / ) ]
q q
V S J q f s q r y f s qβ λ β β λ β η −
≥ ≥
+ − − + + − − .  
Since 1 1( | .)J q  is increasing in 1, q the optimal quantity 1 2=q ξ∗ , for 1 2.q ξ≤    
Now, suppose 1 2q ξ≥  then,  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 20 01 1
1 1 1 1 2 2
( ) = max ( | .) = max ( ( ) ) ( )
[ / ( / ) ( ) ] .
q q
V S J q f h s q h
r y f h s q h
β β λ ξ
β β β λ ξ η
≥ ≥
−
− − + +
− + − − + + −
 
In this case, 1 1( | .)J q  is decreasing in 1, q so the optimal quantity 1 2=q ξ∗ , for 1 2.q ξ≥  
Hence 1 2= .q ξ∗      
Proof of Lemma 4.5.3: 
 When = 0,r  financial hedging is immaterial to the operating decisions and the 
single stage problem can be stated as the following:  
1 1 1 1 , | 2 1 2 2 1 22 2 101
( ) = max {( ) min( , ) ( )[ ] }Q P PqV S s q E s q s h qξβ λ ξ ξ +≥ − + + + − −  
  Consequently, the necessary and sufficient optimality condition is given by: 
| 2 1 22 1
[ ] ( ) ( ) = 0Qs sE s s h h qξβ β β λ− − + + Φ  and the optimal quantity =nvq  
| 2 11 12 1 1 1
[ ]
( ) = ( )
( ) ( )
Q
P PE s s f s
h h
β βλ β βλ
β λ β λ
− −− + − +Φ Φ+ + . Since the convenience yield is non-
negative, nvq   is finite.   
Proof of Theorem 4.5.5: 
 Suppressing the superscripts and the subscripts (except for 1s  and 1P  ), the single 
stage problem can be stated as:  
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 , | 10 0
( ) = max ( | .) = max {( ) min( , ) ( )[ ] }QP Pq qV S J q s q E s q s h qξβ λ ξ ξ +≥ ≥ − + + + − −    
                                          , | 11 [( )/ ( ) min( , ) ( )[ ] ]
Q
P PE r y s q s q s h qξβ β λ ξ ξ η+ −− − + + + − − −    
1 , | 10 0
= max ( | .) = max {( ) ( )[ ] }QP Pq qJ q s q E s q h qξβ λ λ ξ +≥ ≥ − + + − + −    
                                           , | 11 [( )/ ( ) ( )[ ] ]
Q
P PE r y s q s q h qξβ β λ λ ξ η+ −− − + + − + − −    
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Evaluating the expectations,  
1( | .) = ( ) ( ) [ ]J q s q f q h E qξβ λ β λ ξ +− + + − + −
1
10 0
[ / ( / ) ( )( ) ] ( ) ( )
q u Q
sr y s s q h q s dsdξβ β λ β λ ξ η φ φ ξ ξ+ + + − − + − −∫ ∫    
2
10
[ / ( / ) ] ( ) ( )
u Q
sq
r y s s q s dsdξβ β λ β η φ φ ξ ξ∞+ + + − −∫ ∫    
 where 1 11 2
/ ( / ) / ( / )( )( )= , = .y s q y s qh qu u
q q q
η β β λ η β β λλ ξ− + − − + −+ −+
 Following, the necessary and sufficient optimality condition is:  
1
1 10 0
( | .) = ( ) ( ) ( ) [ / ] ( ) ( )
q u Q
s
J q s f h q r s s h s dsd
q ξ ξ
β λ β λ β β φ φ ξ ξ∂ − + + − + Φ + − −∂ ∫ ∫  
2
10
[ / ] ( ) ( ) = 0
u
q
r s s s dsdξβ β λ φ φ ξ ξ∞+ − +∫ ∫ . 
So, we want to show that 
=
( | .) | 0nvq q
J q
q
∂ ≤∂    
First we define ε  such that:  
ˆ2
10 0ˆ {0, }




s s h s dsd
ε
ξε λ
ε β φ φ ξ ξ+
∈ +
− −∫ ∫  
 Then, from the definition of ε , it follows that:  
2 2
1 1= 0 0 0
1 (. | ) | [ / ] ( ) ( ) [ / ] ( ) ( )
q u uQ Q
nv s sq q q
J x s s h s dsd s s s dsd
r q
ε
ξ ξβ φ φ ξ ξ β λ φ φ ξ ξβ
+ ∞∂ ≤ − − + − +∂ ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
2 2
1 10 0
= ( ) [ / ] ( ) ( ) [ / ] ( )
u uQ Q
s sq s s h s ds q s s s ds
ε






= ( )( ( ) ( )) [ / ] ( )





u q h q s s s ds






Φ Φ − Φ + −




2 1 1 10 2
= ( )( / ) [ / ] ( ) ( ) [ / ] ( )
u uQ Q Q
s s su
u s f s s s ds q s s h s ds
ε






= ( / ) ( ) [ / ] ( )





s f s ds s s s ds
q s s h s ds
ε
ξ
β φ β φ
β φ+
− + −





= ( ) ( ) ( ) [ / ] ( )
u uQ Q
s su
s f s ds q s s h s ds
ε




( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ / ] ( )
u uQ Q
s su
q s f s ds q s s h s ds
ε
ξ ξφ β φ+≤ Φ − + Φ − −∫ ∫   
                            (Since 2
0
( ) ( ) < 0
u Q
ss f s dsφ−∫ ) 
                      2
0
( ) [ ] ( )
u Q
sq s f s ds
ε
ξ φ+≤ Φ −∫    (Since 1/f s hβ≤ +  ) 
< 0   (Since =f Es  ) 
Finally note that, when ordered for nvq , if the probability of incurring financial distress is 
equal to zero or one then, nvq  is optimal.   
Proof of Theorem 4.5.6: 
 For given a given quantity decision 1q  , the sufficient optimality condition is 
given by: 
1 1
1 2 2 2 2 22 20 0
2
1 2 2 2 2 2 1 12 2011 1
1
1 1 2 2 2 2 22 20 1
1 2 2 2 2 2 1 12 21 2
[ ] ( ) ( )
[ ] ( ) ( ) = 0 < ,
( | ) =
[ ] ( ) ( )









r f s s ds d
r f s s ds d if x q
J x q
x r f s s ds d





β φ φ ξ ξ
β φ φ ξ ξ
β φ φ ξ ξ











2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
/ ( / ) ( )( ) / ( / )= , = .y f x s q h q y f x s qu u
q x q x q x
η β β λ λ ξ η β β λ− − + − + − − − + −+− − −  
 Observing that 1 1
1
( | )J x q
x
∂
∂   goes to zero as 1x  approach to 1q , proves the desired result 
(note that 1 | 22 1= [ ]
Q
P Pf E s  ).    
Proof of Theorem 4.5.7: 
 Recall that the single period model under the optimal hedging policy is given by:  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 220 01 1
1 1 1 1 2 12
( ) = max ( | .) max ( ) ( ) [ ]
[( / ) ( )[ ] ]
q q
V S J q s q f q h E q
rE f s q h q
ξ
ξ
β λ β λ ξ




= − + + − + −
− + − − + − −
 
 For the worst case (lowest) demand scenario, 2 ,
wξ  firm's operating cash flow is given by 
1 1 2( / ) ( )
nv wf h s q hβ λ ξ− − + +  (assuming the firm orders more than the minimum 
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demand).  If  1 1 1 2( / ) ( ) ,
nv wf h s q hκ β λ ξ≤ − − + +  then the FDC term in the objective is 
equal to zero for 1 =
nvq q , and hence it is optimal to produce .nvq  
 For the rest of the proof , we assume that the firm faces financial distress under 
the worst case demand scenario when 1 = ,
nvq q   i.e.,  1 1 1 2( / ) ( ) .
nv wf h s q hκ β λ ξ≥ − − + +  
Now let ?1q  satisfies ?1 1 11( / ) = 0.f s qλ β κ+ − −   Then, 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 12
( | .) = (1 ){ ( ) ( ) [ ] }J q r s q f q h E q rξβ λ β λ ξ βκ++ − + + − + − −   for ?1 1q q≤   and,   
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22
( | .) = ( ) ( ) [ ]J q s q f q h E qξβ λ β λ ξ +− + + − + −  
( / )1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 220
(( / ) ( )( ) ) ( )
f s q
q
hr f s q h q d
λ β κ
λ ξβ λ β λ ξ κ φ ξ ξ





( | .) = (1 ){ ( ) ( ) ( )}J q r s f h q
q ξ
β λ β λ∂ + − + + − + Φ∂   for 
?




( | .) = ( ) ( ) ( )J q s f h q
q ξ
β λ β λ∂ − + + − + Φ∂  +                                                      
                    1 1 1 11 1 1
2
( / )( / ) ( )f s qr f h s q
hξ
λ β κβ β λ
+ − −+ − − Φ − +  for 
?
1 1.q q≥  
Following, if ?1, nvq q≤ then 1
1




∂  and it is optimal to produce .
nvq  On the other 
hand, if ?1,nvq q≥  then 1
1




∂  and hence, the firm produces less than .
nvq  This 
proves the desired result.   
Proof of Theorem 4.5.8: 
 It suffices to prove that .fq q∗≥  Recall that,  
1 1 1 , | 1 12 2 10 01 1
= arg max ( | = 0) = arg max ( | = 0)Q P P
q q
q J s x E g s xξ
∗
≥ ≥
  and 
1 1 1 1 , | 1 1 12 2 10 01 1
= arg max ( | = ) = arg max ( | = )f Q P P
q q
q J s x q E g s x qξ≥ ≥
 , where 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
2 1 1 1 2 1
( | = 0) = {( ) ( )[ ]
[( / ) ( )[ ] ] },
g s x s q s q h q
r s s q h q
β λ λ ξ
λ β λ ξ κ
+
+ −
− + + − + −
− + − − + − −   
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 1
( | = ) = {( ) ( )[ ]
[( / ) ( )[ ] ] }.
g s x q s q f q h q
r f s q h q
β λ λ ξ
λ β λ ξ κ
+
+ −
− + + − + −





( | = 0) =g s x
q
∂
∂ 1 2 { } 2 1 { } { <0}1 2 1 2{( ) ( ) (( / ) ( ) ) },q q As s h I r s s h I Iξ ξβ λ λ λ β λ≥ ≥− + + − + + + − − +
where 2 1 1 1 2 1= [( / ) ( )[ ] ].A s s q h qλ β λ ξ κ++ − − + − −  
 Observing that 1 1
1
( | = 0)g s x
q
∂
∂  is concave in 2s  and 1,2 2cvf s≤ , it follows that 
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( | = 0) ( | = ) .J s x J s x q
q q
∂ ∂≥∂ ∂   Hence, .
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